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A farmer and a lumberman are sitting at a bar. 
The lumberman says: “I would like to buy your farm.” 
The farmer says: “What is this, some kind of joke?” 
ABSTRACT 
  This Article revisits Lucy v. Zehmer, a 1950s Virginia Supreme 
Court ruling that has become a staple in most contracts courses in 
American law schools. The colorful facts are well known to nearly all 
law students: Lucy and Zehmer met one evening in December 1952 at 
a restaurant in Dinwiddie, Virginia, and, following several drinks and 
much verbal banter, Zehmer wrote a contract on a restaurant bill, in 
which he agreed to sell his farm to Lucy for $50,000. Zehmer later 
insisted that he had been intoxicated and had thought the entire matter 
was a joke. He testified that he had been “high as a Georgia pine” and 
merely bluffing to try to get Lucy to admit that he did not actually 
have $50,000. Upholding the contract, the court ruled that regardless 
of Zehmer’s intent, his outward behavior could reasonably be 
construed to suggest that he had been serious. The court thus invoked 
what is known as the “objective theory of contract formation.” 
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  Our findings suggest that the court misinterpreted the contractual 
setting surrounding that December evening in 1952. Our research 
uncovers several discoveries: (1) Lucy, acting as a middleman for 
southern Virginia’s burgeoning pulp-and-paper industry, sought the 
Ferguson farm for its rich timber reserves; (2) Lucy was one of scores 
of aggressive timber middlemen in the region who eagerly sought 
valuable timberland and prompted a chaotic landgrab, leaving a wake 
of shady transactions and colorful litigation; and (3) within eight 
years of winning injunctive relief from the Virginia Supreme Court 
and purchasing the Ferguson farm from Zehmer for $50,000, Lucy 
earned approximately $142,000 from selling the land and its natural 
resources. These findings call into question the court’s assertion that 
$50,000 was a fair price, its conclusion that Zehmer’s actions 
indicated contractual intent, and its confidence that the objective 
method captured the relevant background in which Lucy’s and 
Zehmer’s exchange took place. More generally, these findings suggest 
that conclusions reached by the objective method are highly 
dependent on both the facts that are retold and the context in which 
those facts occurred, and that historical analysis can meaningfully 
illustrate the limits of legal doctrines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many good stories begin with two men at a bar. Lucy v. Zehmer,1 
“a staple of contracts casebooks since shortly after it was decided” in 
1954,2 is no exception. As generations of law students have learned, 
the case of Lucy v. Zehmer involved two men talking over a bottle of 
liquor the weekend before Christmas.3 Adrian Hardy Zehmer, 
allegedly drunk and joking, scribbled a contract for the sale of his 
farm on the back of a receipt.4 Welford Ordway Lucy accepted and 
left, insisting that Zehmer was bound to the sale.5 The Virginia 
Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Lucy, ruling that a signed 
contract, even one signed by two men drinking at a bar, is no laughing 
matter.6 
 
 1. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954). 
 2. See Keith A. Rowley, You Asked for It, You Got It . . . Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes, 
Prizes, and Contract Law, 3 NEV. L.J. 526, 527 n.7 (2003) (noting that Lucy v. Zehmer appears 
as a “principal case” in ten of fifteen contract-law casebooks published between 2000 and 2003 
and is discussed in a “lengthy note” in an eleventh); see also IAN AYRES & RICHARD E. 
SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 229 (7th ed. 2008); RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: 
CASES AND DOCTRINE 296 (4th ed. 2008); BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, CONTRACTS: 
CASES, DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 71 (2d ed. 2008); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTRACT LAW 11 (3d ed. 2006); JOHN D. CALAMARI, JOSEPH M. PERILLO, HELEN 
HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER & CAROLINE N. BROWN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 1 
(5th ed. 2007); DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS: MAKING AND DOING DEALS 37 (3d ed. 2011); E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CAROL SANGER, NEIL B. COHEN & RICHARD R.W. 
BROOKS, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 117 (7th ed. 2008); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN 
ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 370 (8th ed. 2006); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., 
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 52 (5th ed. 2000); ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, 
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 13 (4th ed. 2007); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. 
HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 441 
(6th ed. 2010); Kenneth M. Alfano, Copyright in Exile: Restoring the Original Parameters of 
Exclusive Reproduction, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 215, 242 n.117 (2006) (noting that Lucy v. 
Zehmer “is a fixture of many law school Contracts casebooks”); Douglas L. Leslie, How Not To 
Teach Contracts, and Any Other Course: Powerpoint, Laptops, and the Casefile Method, 44 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1289, 1300 (2000) (commenting on the “frequency with which Lucy v. Zehmer” 
appears in contracts casebooks).  
 3. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 519 (“I was already high as a Georgia pine, and didn’t have any 
more better sense than to pour another great big slug out and gulp it down, and he took one 
too.” (quoting Hardy Zehmer) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 4. Id. at 517–18. 
 5. Id. at 518. 
 6. See id. at 522 (“The complainants are entitled to have specific performance of the 
contract sued on.”). The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was the highest court in Virginia at 
the time. Due to changes made in the Virginia Constitution of 1971, the court today is known as 
the Supreme Court of Virginia. THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA (2010), available at http://
www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/scvinfo.pdf. To avoid confusion, we refer to the court by its 
present, rather than its historic, title.  
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That is, at least, the conventional story of the case, as told by the 
court, subsequent casebooks, and scholarly articles.7 For the most 
part, Lucy v. Zehmer is narrowly read to represent its final holding: a 
court will only look to the outwardly manifested conduct of the 
parties to determine contractual intent.8 This principle, also referred 
to as the “objective theory of contracts,”9 remains as solidly 
entrenched in law in 2012 as when the court’s opinion was issued 
more than five decades ago.10 And even though the case presents a 
straightforward legal issue, stemming from what appeared to be a 
 
 7. See, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 
957 (1958) (noting that the court in Lucy v. Zehmer held that a promisor who “signed [a] 
document as a joke although he kept a straight face to the promisee” was bound to keep that 
promise). Professors Edwin Patterson, George Goble, and Harry Jones were among the first to 
include the case in a casebook. In their book, these authors questioned whether Lucy had 
known that Zehmer had been joking and whether that fact mattered. See EDWIN W. 
PATTERSON, GEORGE W. GOBLE & HARRY W. JONES, CONTRACTS 22–26 (4th ed. 1957) 
(“Suppose the plaintiff knew that the defendant in the principal case intended the matter as a 
joke. What should be the result?”); see also Keith A. Rowley, Beware of the Dark Side of the 
Farce, 10 NEV. L.J. 15, 15 (2002) (“The case best known to most lawyers and judges in which a 
party attempted to avoid contractual liability on the basis that it was only kidding when it made 
the alleged promise or formed the alleged contract is Lucy v. Zehmer.”); Lauren E. Miller, 
Note, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Failure of the Objective Theory To Promote Fairness 
in Language-Barrier Contracting, 43 IND. L. REV. 175, 183 (2009) (citing Lucy v. Zehmer for the 
principle that a contract is still enforceable when a party claims to have been joking when the 
contract was signed). 
 8. See, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, Magic and Contract: The Role of Intent, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN 
L. REV. 464, 466 (2005) (noting that Lucy v. Zehmer is “studied by many first-year law students” 
to demonstrate the “elementary principle of contracts that the relevant intent is the objective, 
expressed intent of the actor, not his secret, subjective intent”); Laura E. Little, Regulating 
Funny: Humor and the Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1235, 1258 (2009) (citing Lucy v. Zehmer for 
the proposition that a person cannot claim that he was just joking when his words and conduct 
would lead a reasonable person to believe otherwise). 
 9. See Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 381 
(2007) (explaining that Lucy v. Zehmer is one of the “classic cases” used to demonstrate the 
“objective theory of contracts”); see also Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1125 (2008) (describing Lucy v. Zehmer as “an illustrative case” of the 
principles embodied by the objective theory of contracts); Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing 
Civil Justice: Commercial Arbitration and the Civil Justice System, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 578, 
578 (2000) (describing the conflict in Lucy v. Zehmer as one between “the objective versus 
subjective theory of contract”); Geoffrey R. Watson, A Casebook for All Seasons?, 20 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 277, 282 (1997) (reviewing E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1995)) (calling Lucy v. Zehmer “an excellent 
introduction to the objective theory of contract”).  
 10. See Solan, supra note 9, at 354–55 (“The actual states of mind of the parties are not the 
subject of legally relevant inquiry. . . . While there is some debate about how and when this state 
of affairs developed, there is little controversy about its existence.” (footnote omitted)). 
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remarkably simple contract,11 its story—in large part because of its 
colorful fact pattern—has become a “classic case[]” used to introduce 
foundational principles related to intent in contracts.12 Despite this 
attention, little more is known about the case than what is found in 
the Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion. Given the case’s prominence 
in contracts casebooks for more than half a century, and given the 
growing body of “stories” research into other prominent and classic 
cases,13 the dispute between Welford Lucy and Hardy Zehmer begs to 
be included in the archive of stories.14 
Delving into the story of Lucy v. Zehmer, like many of the other 
stories inquiries, yields surprises and lessons that both inform the 
contemporary understanding of the case and generate deeper insights 
into contract law. First, just as scholarly articles suggest that the 
famous property case about a stolen fox was not really about the fox15 
and that the famous contracts case about a bridge was not primarily 
about the bridge,16 the dispute in Lucy v. Zehmer was not primarily 
 
 11. See Stephen M. Edwards, Purchase and Sale Agreements, in 1 MASS. CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUC., INC., DRAFTING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE DOCUMENTS IN 
MASSACHUSETTS ch. 2, § 2.2 (2004 & Supp. 2009), available at Westlaw, DCREDMAI MA-
CLE 2-1 (noting the admirable succinctness of the agreement involved in the case).  
 12. Impracticable Presidents, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 417, 417 (2003). For the same reasons, the 
case is also a favorite example in undergraduate business-law courses. See, e.g., JOHN E. 
ADAMSON, LAW FOR PERSONAL AND BUSINESS USE 168 (18th ed. 2008) (offering the Lucy v. 
Zehmer fact pattern as an example and asking whether the contract should be enforceable); 
FRANK B. CROSS & ROGER LEROY MILLER, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS: TEXT 
AND CASES 200–01 (7th ed. 2009) (using Lucy v. Zehmer to illustrate how courts approach 
contractual intent). 
 13. See, e.g., CONTRACTS STORIES (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007) (gathering eleven different 
articles, each providing newly uncovered facts about and insight into eleven principal cases used 
by many contracts casebooks). 
 14. Professors Robert Scott and Jody Kraus offer an initial hypothesis about what 
motivated the parties to this dispute, relying on unsubstantiated rumors relayed by a former 
student who grew up in Dinwiddie, but they note that even their hypothesis leaves numerous 
questions unanswered. ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY: 
TEACHER’S MANUAL 4–5 (3d ed. 2003). We address their hypothesis—and the questions they 
pose—in our first Part.  
 15. Bethany R. Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v. Post, 55 
DUKE L.J. 1089, 1089 (2006) (arguing that “the heart of the conflict [in Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 
175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805),] was a contest over which community would control the shared 
resources of the town and how those resources would be used,” rather than over literal 
ownership of the dead fox that was at the center of the lawsuit). 
 16. Barak Richman, Jordi Weinstock & Jason Mehta, A Bridge, a Tax Revolt, and the 
Struggle To Industrialize: The Story and Legacy of Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 84 
N.C. L. REV. 1841, 1841–42 (2006) (explaining how a famous case “used to illustrate the ‘duty to 
mitigate’” in many contracts casebooks was actually rooted in a “dispute . . . about the 
legitimacy of local government”). 
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about the Ferguson farm. Instead, the lawsuit was part of a larger 
upheaval over the control of increasingly valuable timber resources in 
the wake of a Southern revolution in pulp-and-paper production. 
Moreover, that this underlying context of the case remained secret for 
so long was no accident. The context’s relative obscurity is a 
testament to a deliberate and successful effort by the Southern timber 
industry, in an attempt to minimize public outcry, to acquire timber 
and timberlands through intermediaries like Welford Lucy. That the 
context has remained hidden is also a reflection of how economic 
circumstances and contractual environments can be concealed both 
from an appellate court’s review and from generations of scrutinizing 
students. 
Although the case is more than five decades old, the trail of 
documentary evidence is sufficient to tell a more complete story of 
Lucy v. Zehmer. We tell this story in four Parts. First, we take a closer 
look at the order of the trial court and the opinion of the Virginia 
Supreme Court, identifying inconsistencies and other curiosities in 
the later court’s story. Second, we describe the parties to the lawsuit, 
taking care to go beyond the narrow caricatures provided by the court 
and introducing some important characters—including the lawyers—
who are not part of the traditional narrative. Third, we examine the 
history of the lumber and paper industries of southern Virginia and 
the state’s industrial revolution through the 1950s, the time period 
when the dispute and litigation over the Ferguson farm occurred. The 
region’s rapid post-World War II industrialization induced significant 
changes in the region’s technology, business models, and timberland 
values, which in turn led to conflicts between neighbors and 
significant litigation. This economic and social tumult is central to 
understanding the context in which Welford Lucy’s momentous 
meeting with Hardy Zehmer occurred. And fourth, we discuss the 
Lucy brothers’ significant roles in the lumber industry, their success 
as industry middlemen, and what might have caused them to litigate 
over the Ferguson farm. In light of our findings, we reexamine the 
Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion—in particular, revisiting its 
conclusion that the transaction was fair and equitable and trying to 
appreciate the broader forces at work when Lucy entered Zehmer’s 
diner on December 20, 1952. 
Perhaps most significant, our findings reveal deficiencies in the 
objective theory of contracts, the very doctrine that Lucy v. Zehmer 
has come to represent. The Virginia Supreme Court ruled on Lucy’s 
behalf because it concluded that the events of that December evening 
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would have led a reasonable person to believe that Zehmer intended 
to enter into a contract.17 Unmentioned in the court’s narrative are 
important features of the economic and legal environment that 
surrounded the encounter: significant growth in southern Virginia’s 
pulp-and-paper industry, a consequent sharp rise in timber prices, and 
a landgrab by zealous timber brokers that generated spurious land 
sales and tedious work for southern Virginia’s courtrooms. If the 
court had considered these facts in its description of Lucy’s fateful 
conversation with Zehmer, a reasonable person may have been less 
likely to conclude that Zehmer intended to be contractually bound. In 
short, historical analysis not only reveals deficiencies in the court’s 
reasoning but also illustrates that the objective method generates 
conclusions that are highly dependent on the surrounding narrative. 
Historians’ ability to construct alternative narratives therefore 
highlights the legal value of historical analysis while weakening the 
robustness of the objective theory itself. 
I.  THE VIEW FROM RICHMOND 
Most of Lucy v. Zehmer’s central events took place in Dinwiddie 
County, Virginia, a rural community located between Richmond and 
the North Carolina border and home to several pivotal Civil War 
battles in early 1865.18 Dinwiddie’s economy was historically agrarian, 
relying chiefly on tobacco and cotton in the early twentieth century.19 
Although a mere forty miles separate Dinwiddie and Richmond, 
Virginia’s state capital, the Dinwiddie court viewed Lucy’s dispute 
with Zehmer quite differently from the supreme court in Richmond, 
and the unusual interplay between the trial and appellate courts hints 
at these different vantage points. In fact, even a surface examination 
 
 17. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954). 
 18. For a detailed description of Dinwiddie during the Civil War, see RICHARD L. JONES, 
DINWIDDIE COUNTY: CARREFOUR OF THE COMMONWEALTH 134–64 (1976). See generally A. 
WILSON GREENE, THE FINAL BATTLES OF THE PETERSBURG CAMPAIGN: BREAKING THE 
BACKBONE OF THE REBELLION 175–84 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the events leading from the 
Battle of Dinwiddie Courthouse to the Battle of Five Forks); Dallas D. Irvine, The Fall of 
Richmond: Evacuation and Occupation, 3 J. AM. MIL. INST. 66 (1939) (describing how the 
battles in Dinwiddie County “made it imperative to prepare at once for evacuation of the 
position on the James”). 
 19. Walter Gordon Browder & Linwood Everett Lunsford, An Economic and Social 
Survey of Dinwiddie County, UNIV. OF VA. RECORD EXTENSION SERIES, Oct. 1937, at 1, 54–55 
(“[T]he county is almost entirely agrarian, and the livelihood of the citizens depends upon the 
fertility and productiveness of the soil . . . . Tobacco is the leading cash crop . . . . Cotton is the 
next most important crop in the county . . . .”).  
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of the Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion in Lucy v. Zehmer leaves the 
casual reader with some curiosities. 
To begin with, in contrast to the appellate court’s embellishment 
of the case’s amusing and flavorful fact pattern, the trial court 
disposed of the case with a humorless and expedient order.20 After 
hearing initial arguments from attorneys on both sides and reviewing 
the slim record of evidence—a brief series of depositions taken in the 
Brunswick and Dinwiddie County courts before trial—trial Judge 
John Garland Jefferson Jr. promptly dismissed the action in a three-
sentence decree.21 He ruled simply that the Lucy brothers had “failed 
to establish their right to specific performance of the alleged 
contract.”22 
Perhaps because of the absence of factual determinations from 
the trial court, Justice Archibald C. Buchanan provided an elaborate 
description of the relevant events when he overturned the order.23 
These circumstances placed the Virginia Supreme Court in the 
unusual position of being an initial finder of fact, producing an 
appellate opinion many times longer, and much more in depth, than 
the trial court’s ruling. Moreover, Justice Buchanan discarded the 
lower court’s decision with gusto, finding the contract to be both 
legitimate and enforceable and ridiculing Zehmer’s lawyers for 
advancing “an unusual, if not bizarre, defense.”24 Rather than 
remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether additional 
evidence would support the appellate court’s lengthy characterization 
of the facts, the Virginia Supreme Court handed Lucy a final victory, 
allowing him to take possession of the disputed Ferguson farm.25 
In addition to this unusual dynamic between the trial and 
appellate courts, Justice Buchanan’s famous opinion has its own 
contradictions and mysteries, very few of which have attracted 
 
 20. Record at 9, Lucy, 84 S.E.2d 516 (No. 4272).  
 21. Id. The evidence relied upon is largely contained in a set of depositions of witnesses 
taken in the courthouse of the town of Lawrenceville in neighboring Brunswick County, 
Virginia. See generally id. at 10–84 (compiling the depositions taken in preparation for trial). 
 22. Id. at 518. 
 23. See generally Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 516–20 (leading the reader through the facts as laid out 
in opposing testimony before delving into the legal issues presented by both parties to the 
appeal).  
 24. Id. at 520. 
 25. Id. at 522–23; see also Deed (1954), in 90 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 365, 365–
66 (containing a copy of the deed confirming the transfer of the Ferguson farm from A.H. 
Zehmer to W.O. Lucy).  
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attention from legal scholars.26 Scrutinizing this oft-told but 
unquestioned legal tale illuminates where historical analysis might 
offer lessons. 
A. A Matter of Mysterious Motivations 
On the surface, the case described by Justice Buchanan appears 
to be a local dispute between two relatively unsophisticated 
neighbors. Lucy was a “lumberman and farmer”; Zehmer “operated a 
restaurant, filling station and motor court”;27 and the contract 
appeared to be informal, uncalculated, and driven by liquor, even if 
the court did not ultimately believe that the men had been legally 
intoxicated at the time.28 In Dinwiddie County, this view has 
persisted; fifty years later, one community leader still described the 
dispute as arising out of “a little alcohol, cards and greed.”29 
The record provides a reasonable basis for concluding that the 
dispute was the result of impulsive action. Testifying that he had been 
 
 26. Among the few who have given some scrutiny to the famous case is the noted legal 
scholar Professor Allan Farnsworth, who raises a significant timing issue in the case. See E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 55–65 
(1998) (“[T]he Zehmers were already bound by their promise, even though there was no 
possibility that [Lucy] had relied on it in the few seconds between the exchange of promises and 
[Zehmer’s] protestation. But why?”). Pointing to Zehmer’s allegations that he had reneged on 
his promise shortly after signing the contract and that he had subsequently refused the $5 
offered by Lucy for consideration that same night, Professor Farnsworth questions whether such 
actions are consistent with the court’s ultimate conclusion that the contract was valid. Id. at 56. 
Farnsworth argues that this almost-immediate repudiation of the contract raises crucial 
questions about exactly when the contract was formed between the parties and what effect 
Zehmer’s subsequent statements should have had on Lucy’s reliance. Id. Nonetheless, 
Farnsworth ultimately defends the court’s decision to uphold the contract despite these issues 
with timing, arguing that once a contract is signed, it does not matter when a party reneges on 
that contract. Id. at 58. Farnsworth argues that the law presumes that reliance takes place 
whether disagreement is expressed two minutes or two weeks after a contract’s consummation. 
Id. at 59. In response, Professor Richard Spiedel points out that Lucy actually contested these 
facts and that, ultimately, the court instead accepted Lucy’s statements that he had already 
raised the $50,000 and had consulted his lawyer about the transaction before Zehmer 
communicated his refusal to sell. Richard E. Spiedel, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 255, 267 n.57 (2000) 
(reviewing FARNSWORTH, supra); see also Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 521–22 (providing the disputed 
text). Although only a small issue in the dispute, this timing question is particularly significant to 
those seeking to understand the overall contours of the court’s final holding; after all, if what 
matters is the outwardly manifested “objective” intent, determining which outward 
manifestations the court will consider is important. The timing question is also heavily informed 
by the context and surrounding circumstances in which the purported assent takes place. 
 27. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 518. 
 28. See id. at 518–19 (describing the conditions of the negotiation). 
 29. Email from Richard Liles, President, Bank of McKenney, to author (Mar. 6, 2009, 08:46 
AM) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
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as “high as a Georgia pine,”30 Zehmer and his attorneys argued that 
the alleged contract had been a joke between two “doggoned 
drunks.”31 Zehmer had immediately retracted his purported 
acceptance, and the next day a presumably more sober Zehmer had 
informed Lucy that he had no intention of holding Lucy to the alleged 
agreement.32 Similarly, Lucy, in his own testimony, expressed some 
concern about the manner in which the agreement had been 
reached;33 when asked by one of Zehmer’s lawyers whether he had 
felt drunk or happy on the night of the signing, Lucy answered, 
“Looks like I must have been feeling rich.”34 
Even mildly dissecting the court’s opinion reveals a calculated 
dispute with more significance than is portrayed in the conventional 
telling. If Zehmer had been reluctant to sell and Lucy had believed 
the price was too high, they would have had sufficient grounds to 
reach an amicable settlement to the supposedly spontaneous and ill-
advised agreement. But Lucy and Zehmer did not settle. To the 
contrary, Lucy promptly secured payment for the farm, and, when 
Zehmer refused to deliver title, Lucy hired an attorney and brought 
suit to compel performance.35 Then, when the trial court invalidated 
that contract—relieving Lucy of any obligation he might have felt to 
perform—Lucy pursued an appeal before the state’s highest court, 
triggering a legal battle that presumably was costly and time-
consuming for both parties.36 If the procedural history of Lucy v. 
Zehmer reveals anything, it shows that Lucy’s legal actions spoke 
much louder than his words of regret. 
Moreover, Lucy did not hire just any attorney to enforce the 
contract—he sought Virginia’s best. Albertis S. Harrison Jr. who 
 
 30. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 520 (quoting Zehmer) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 31. Id. (quoting Zehmer’s characterization of the encounter as “two doggoned drunks 
bluffing to see who could talk the biggest and say the most” (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
The court ultimately concluded that “Zehmer [had] not been intoxicated to the extent of being 
unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the instrument he [had] executed, and 
hence that [the] instrument [wa]s not to be invalidated on that ground.” Id.  
 32. Id. at 521. 
 33. Id. The court noted that Lucy had admitted that he “[had] been stuck before and 
[would go] through with it.” Id. (quoting Lucy) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 34. Record, supra note 20, at 63. 
 35. Id. at 46–48.  
 36. The dispute lasted nearly two years, from the initial dispute through Zehmer’s final 
conveyance of the property to the Lucy brothers. See Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 517 (noting that the 
dispute began on December 20, 1952); Deed, supra note 25, at 365 (recording the conveyance of 
the Ferguson farm to the Lucy brothers on December 17, 1954).  
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represented Lucy at both the trial and the appellate level,37 was a 
legendary figure in Virginia. In the 1960s, at the height of his power, 
Harrison would serve as Virginia’s governor and then as a justice on 
the Virginia Supreme Court.38 By 1952, Harrison’s political clout had 
already started to rise. An ambitious state senator who was first 
elected to the state legislature in 1947,39 Harrison’s legendary status 
began to take shape when he took over as campaign manager for 
Senator Harry S. Byrd’s 1952 reelection campaign during a tough 
year for the senator’s political organization.40 Harrison was a natural 
choice five years later to be the Democratic candidate for attorney 
general of Virginia,41 a post that left him “responsible for handling in 
court the state’s massive resistance strategy, a plan devised by Byrd to 
prevent federally ordered integration of the state’s public schools.”42 
Later, Harrison was depicted by the press as the person responsible 
for keeping the Byrd machine running smoothly into the 1960s.43 In 
 
 37. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 517. Lucy was also represented by local judge Emerson D. Baugh, 
id., a judge in Brunswick County. Although Judge Baugh did not have the same notoriety as 
Harrison, he evidently was a respected lawyer in southside Virginia. See 2 MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 2444 (1956) (giving Judge Baugh a very high recommendation).  
 38. Wolfgang Saxon, Albertis S. Harrison Jr., 88, Dies; Led Virginia as Segregation Fell, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at B8. 
 39. Materials from this first election are available at the Governor Albertis Harrison Room 
of the Brunswick County Museum in Lawrenceville, Virginia. Copies of these materials are on 
file with the Duke Law Journal.  
 40. See, e.g., Peter R. Henriques, The Byrd Organization Crushes a Liberal Challenge, 
1950–1953, 87 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 1, 18 (1979) (describing how seriously Senator 
Byrd took a primary challenge from liberal Democrats and explaining that, to counter the 
challenge, “[a] knowledgeable state senator and future governor, Albertis S. Harrison, was 
tapped as Byrd’s campaign manager”). 
 41. GAY NEALE WITH HENRY L. MITCHELL, JR. & W.M. PRITCHETT, BRUNSWICK 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1720–1975, at 287 (1975).  
 42. Albertis Harrison, Governor 1962–66, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), Jan. 24, 
1995, at B4, available at 1995 WLNR 4777880.  
 43. A political cartoon from July 13, 1961, for example, depicts Harrison’s lasting influence 
with the Byrd machine even into the 1960s. In the cartoon, Harrison sits with his arm around 
Senator Byrd in a 1920s-era automobile labeled the Byrd Machine. The caption reads: “The old 
buggy runs as good as ever, Harry!” Allie Edward Stakes Stephens, another Byrd adviser, is 
depicted falling off the vehicle. The cartoon thus appears to show Harrison gaining influence in 
the Byrd Machine at the expense of Stephens. The cartoon is on file with the Duke Law 
Journal.  
Although Stephens remained a disciple of Byrd in the 1950s—and was elected lieutenant 
governor with Byrd’s support—he later broke with the Byrd Machine over school 
desegregation. A Guide to the Papers of A.E.S. Stephens, 1949–1961, VA. HERITAGE, http://ead.
lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=odu/vino00007.xml (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). Stephens ran 
for governor in 1961 without Byrd’s support and easily lost the primary to Byrd’s chosen 
candidate, Albertis S. Harrison. The race was seen as an indication that the Byrd Machine 
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short, Lucy’s lawyer was the man to whom Senator Byrd turned for 
counsel and to whom Virginia turned in its last stand to defend 
segregation.44 
Curiously sandwiched between fixing the Byrd Machine in 1952 
and making Virginia’s last stand in defense of segregation in 1958 was 
Harrison’s involvement as the plaintiffs’ lead attorney in Lucy v. 
Zehmer. These facts raise two important questions: Why did Lucy 
retain such a big name to argue such a small case, and why did 
Harrison accept the representation? Lucy’s actions belie the cash-
strapped buyer depicted in his own testimony and in the court’s 
opinion, and, compared to the other statewide challenges that 
Harrison took on, a provincial liquor-induced dispute over a farm in 
southern Virginia seems downright pedestrian. 
B. The $50,000 Question 
Questions about the motivations underlying Lucy v. Zehmer 
ultimately lead to questions about the disputed object—the Ferguson 
farm—and whether $50,000 was really a fair price for the property.45 
All too often, students and scholars overlook this question, and some 
casebooks omit the court’s discussion of price altogether.46 Such an 
 
remained a force in Virginia politics despite the political infighting of the 1950s. See Virginia: 
Byrd’s Nest, TIME, July 21, 1961, at 15 (reporting that “the primary did make one thing clear: if 
Harry Byrd is losing his grip, no one has told the voters of Virginia”). 
 44. Saxon, supra note 38. Harrison reportedly had his doubts about Byrd’s campaign of 
massive resistance, noting “in a letter to Byrd in August 1958 . . . [that] admission of blacks to 
white schools probably was inevitable.” Albertis Harrison, Governor 1962–66, supra note 42. 
But Harrison, the consummate attorney, was willing to fight hard to delay this inevitable result. 
As he wrote in a letter in July 1957,  
Before this case was tried, I too had an idea, which I expressed to the Commission, 
that . . . we could literally litigate negro plaintiffs to death and force them to exhaust 
administrative remedies. At that time, I envisioned appeals to the School Boards, 
then to the Circuit Court and then to our Supreme Court.  
Letter from Senator A.S. Harrison Jr., to Hon. C. Harrison Mann Jr. 2 (July 27, 1957) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). Although Harrison was ultimately unsuccessful in preventing 
desegregation during his tenure as attorney general, his strategy did delay it. He succeeded, for 
example, in forcing the NAACP to refile a constitutional challenge against state laws designed 
to delay integration—which had been previously successfully litigated in federal court—in a 
substantially less favorable Virginia state court. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 
(1959) (“[T]he judgment below will be vacated and the case remanded to the District Court, 
with instructions to afford the appellees a reasonable opportunity to bring appropriate 
proceedings in the Virginia courts . . . .”). 
 45. This was the first question asked by one local historian after his initial review of the 
case. Interview with Ronald Seagrave (Feb. 27, 2009).  
 46. See, e.g., AYRES & SPEIDEL, supra note 2, at 229–32 (omitting the court’s discussion of 
price); BURTON, supra note 2, at 11–15 (same); CALAMARI ET AL., supra note 2, at 1–7 (same); 
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omission is not necessarily illogical. Both parties stipulated in their 
initial pleadings that a real-estate expert, C.C. Johnson, would, if 
called, testify that $50,000 was a fair price for the Ferguson farm.47 
Moreover, casebook authors most often rely upon Lucy v. Zehmer to 
demonstrate the main theory set forward by the court—the objective 
theory of contract formation—which dictates that one should look for 
objective signs of offer and acceptance rather than scrutinize the 
fairness of the transaction.48 
An assessment of the fairness of the sales price was, however, 
central to the court’s evaluation of Zehmer’s equity claim, and Justice 
Buchanan relied on contextual evidence in determining that $50,000 
had been an objectively reasonable price for the farm. In rather 
sweeping language, Justice Buchanan denied the equity claim because 
“[t]he farm had been bought for $11,000 and was assessed for taxation 
at $6,300. The purchase price was $50,000. Zehmer admitted that it 
was a good price.”49 If anything, Justice Buchanan described the deal 
as a windfall for Zehmer. 
But if the contract had truly created a windfall for Zehmer, why 
would Zehmer have invested so much in invalidating it, and, similarly, 
why would Lucy have tried so vigorously to enforce it? Although 
Justice Buchanan noted that Zehmer had expressed some interest in 
giving the farm to his son, the court’s opinion does not explain why 
Zehmer had wanted his son to have the Ferguson farm in particular 
or why Zehmer could not, with his supposed windfall, have purchased 
a similar farm and pocketed the difference.50 
There are other reasons to question Justice Buchanan’s valuation 
even though it came directly from the record. First, Justice Buchanan 
only provided the historical price at which Zehmer had bought the 
farm and the property’s tax assessment, neither of which is a reliable 
 
THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON 
CONTRACTS 1–7 (4th ed. 2004) (same); FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 2, at 117–20 (same); 
GEORGE W. KUNEY & ROBERT M. LLOYD, CONTRACTS: TRANSACTIONS AND LITIGATION 3–
10 (3d ed. 2011) (same).  
 47. Record, supra note 20, at 10. 
 48. See, e.g., Solan, supra note 9, at 354–55 (summarizing the objective theory of contracts). 
 49. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954). 
 50. See id. at 520 (noting Zehmer’s intention to give the farm to his son). The situation 
might have been different if the Ferguson farm had been in the Zehmer family for generations, 
but Zehmer had only acquired the property in 1943, Deed (1943), in 69 DINWIDDIE COUNTY 
DEED BOOK 167, 167, eleven years before the litigation commenced. 
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indicator of the fair market value of real estate.51 At the same time, 
Justice Buchanan failed to include other relevant values, including 
Lucy’s offers in 1944 and 1945 of $20,000 for the same farm, only a 
year or so after Zehmer had purchased it for $11,000.52 The court 
mentioned this fact in its discussion of enforceability but omitted the 
fact from its discussion of price.53 
The mixed circumstantial evidence is enough to question 
whether Zehmer really did enjoy a windfall, or whether Lucy may in 
fact have been the party who received a bonanza profit. Nevertheless, 
Zehmer appears to have thought, at least at first, that $50,000 was a 
good price for the farm.54 The price seemed so good, in fact, that 
 
 51. The $11,000 price that Hardy Zehmer originally paid for the Ferguson farm was, in 
accounting terms, the farm’s historical or “book value,” see Vicki O. Tucker, Pattie G. Meire & 
Phyllis M. Rubinstein, The RTC: A Practical Guide to the Receivership/Conservatorship Process 
and the Resolution of Failed Thrifts, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 17 n.74 (1990) (explaining that book 
value is generally historical value), but book values are generally regarded as unrealistic and 
unreliable, particularly for real-estate assets that appreciate over time, see Peta Spender, Guns 
and Greenmail: Fear and Loathing After Gambotto, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 96, 99–100 (1998) 
(“The book value of the land held by the company at the time of the meeting was $15,035,000, 
but its market value was estimated to be $25,977,000. It is therefore a reasonable assumption 
that the value of the assets held by the company was increasing.”). Tax assessments—which rely 
on many factors unrelated to market prices—can be even more problematic. See William E. 
Banfield, Real Estate Taxes, in NEGOTIATING THE SOPHISTICATED REAL ESTATE DEAL 2008: 
HIGH-STAKES STRATEGIES IN CHALLENGING TIMES 215, 218 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. 554, 2008) (noting that “value for real estate tax purposes is often 
different than value for other purposes . . . and in most cases it is very different from purchase 
price” (emphasis omitted)). 
 52. Record, supra note 20, at 2, 56 (referencing Deed, supra note 50, at 167).  
 53. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 518 (explaining that Zehmer similarly backed out of that alleged 
contract for the farm). Even Justice Buchanan’s best argument for the price’s fairness, that 
“Zehmer [had] admitted that [$50,000] was a good price,” id. at 522, is questionable because the 
admission was arguably taken out of context. Zehmer made the statement at a Christmas party 
the day after the contract had been signed. It was an informal environment, and when Zehmer 
saw Lucy, he approached Lucy to tell him that they did not have a deal, even though he was 
“not trying to say this because . . . the price [was] too cheap.” Record, supra note 20, at 38. 
Instead, Zehmer explained, “[I]f I wanted to sell, I think $50,000 would be a good price, and I 
think you would get stuck.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). How much research Zehmer 
had done before making this casual judgment about the price is unclear. This lack of familiarity 
with contemporary prices for land was similarly evident when Zehmer made clear in his 
deposition that he was not prepared to discuss prices. See id. at 33 (showing that Zehmer did not 
remember when he had bought the farm, how many acres the farm had included, or how much 
he had paid for the farm). 
 54. Record, supra note 20, at 44–45. During his deposition, Zehmer recalled having told 
Lucy the day after the alleged contract had been signed, “I am not trying to claim it wasn’t a 
deal on account of the fact the price was too low . . . . If I had wanted to sell $50,000.00 would be 
a good price, in fact I think you would get stuck at $50,000.00.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Zehmer allegedly did not believe that Lucy was serious.55 Lucy, by 
contrast, must have felt that the price was a bargain that was worth 
pursuing through an expensive appeal. Clarifying the actual 
economics of the transaction may go a long way toward explaining 
the unusual banter that December evening. 
C. Alternative Narratives 
A number of dynamics are at play when an appellate court 
reverses a lower court’s ruling, particularly when the reversal is as 
sweeping as the Virginia Supreme Court’s rejection of Judge 
Jefferson’s refusal to award Lucy the Ferguson farm. Many of these 
familiar dynamics, articulated by historians and legal scholars, appear 
to have been present in the trial and appellate proceedings in Lucy v. 
Zehmer and may explain the two courts’ sharp disagreement as to 
how the case should have been decided. 
One standard explanation is simple judicial politics. Harrison’s 
extensive political activities on behalf of the Democratic Byrd 
Machine,56 including his role as a state senator on the senate 
committee that recommended candidates for judicial appointment, 
may have given Harrison influence over the justices on the Virginia 
Supreme Court57—all of whom were Democrats or at least 
Democratic appointees.58 Zehmer, by contrast, was active in the 
state’s Republican Party and served as an alternate delegate from 
Virginia to the Republican National Conventions in 1948, 1952, and 
1956.59 Along these lines, one leading casebook speculates that 
“[a]pparently the Zehmers were infamous as being the only 
Republicans in this rural south side Virginia county during the era of 
the Byrd machine and were not ‘well-liked.’”60 One must remember 
 
 55. See, e.g., id. at 38 (“I thought he was just needling me. I didn’t think then [that] he 
considered it a deal.”). 
 56. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Letter from Senator A.S. Harrison Jr., to Hon. C. Harrison Mann Jr., supra note 44, 
at 1 (noting that Harrison was on the Senate Committee on Courts of Justice). 
 58. Governors of Virginia, ENCYCLOPEDIA VA., http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/
Governors_of_Virginia (last updated Jan. 18, 2012) (listing all of the former governors of 
Virginia and showing that all of the governors from 1886 to 1970 were Democrats). 
 59. Lawrence Kestenbaum, Index to Politicians: Zealey to Ziegeweid, POL. GRAVEYARD, 
http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/zebb-ziegenheim.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2011) (entry for 
Zehmer, A.H.).  
 60. SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 14, at 5 (quoting one of Professor Scott’s students who 
was from Dinwiddie County). But Professors Scott and Kraus ultimately conclude: “While [the 
fact that the Zehmers were not well liked] might explain local prejudice against the Zehmers, it 
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that the 1950s were a time when the Democratic and Republican 
parties were thoroughly consumed with fights over segregation and 
were bitterly divided in Virginia. Justice Buchanan also fits into this 
narrative: his vitriolic opinion in Naim v. Naim,61 which upheld the 
constitutionality of Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws and which was 
issued only one year after Lucy v. Zehmer, suggests that his court may 
well have been hostile toward Republican litigants.62 
Nonetheless, despite an exhaustive search, we have found little 
evidence that Zehmer would have been an obvious target of the Byrd 
Machine. In fact, Zehmer’s lead defense counsel—Morton G. 
Goode—was also a prominent Democrat and state senator.63 The trial 
judge who initially dismissed the suit, Judge Jefferson Jr., was 
similarly active in local Democratic politics and was probably a 
 
doesn’t explain what happened here. The Zehmers won in the Dinwiddie circuit court. They lost 
at the Supreme Court in Richmond where presumably no one knew anyone.” Id. There is 
reason to suspect, however, that politically motivated discrimination against Zehmer might have 
been more pronounced in Richmond than in Dinwiddie. The Virginia Supreme Court would 
have known Albertis S. Harrison Jr., the lead attorney for the plaintiffs. But Harrison, originally 
from Brunswick County, NEALE, supra note 41, at 288, might not have been as well known by 
the circuit court in neighboring Dinwiddie County as Zehmer’s lawyers, see Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 
S.E.2d 516, 517 (Va. 1954) (listing White and Goode as Zehmer’s attorneys). who had both 
spent most of their careers as officers of that court, see, e.g., Deed (1938), in 62 DINWIDDIE 
COUNTY DEED BOOK 600, 600 (noting that White was a special commissioner in the court). 
Accordingly, a political explanation might suggest that Zehmer won in the local forum, where 
his local counsel were better known, and Lucy subsequently won in the state capital, where his 
lead attorney was a rising star. 
 61. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955). 
 62. Justice Buchanan’s opinion concludes, 
We are unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, or in any 
other provision of that great document, any words or any intendment which prohibit 
the State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens, or 
which denies the power of the State to regulate the marriage relation so that it shall 
not have a mongrel breed of citizens. We find there no requirement that the State 
shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of racial pride, but must permit the 
corruption of blood even though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship. 
Both sacred and secular history teach that nations and races have better advanced in 
human progress when they cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and culture 
and developed their own peculiar genius. 
Id. at 756. 
 63. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, BOOK OF THE STATES 1952–1953, at 559 (1952) 
(listing Morton G. Goode as the president pro tem of the Virginia state senate—a body 
composed of thirty-eight Democrats and two Republicans at the time); A Guide to the Harry 
Flood Byrd, Sr. Papers, VA. HERITAGE, http://ead.lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=uva-sc/
viu01045.xml (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (referencing an array of correspondence sent between 
Senator Byrd and M.G. Goode between 1923 and 1948). 
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member of the Byrd Machine.64 These facts undermine the 
supposition that Zehmer was somehow the victim of politicized 
Democrats in Richmond. 
A second explanation rests on the different policy priorities of 
the trial and appellate judges. By the time Lucy filed for an injunction 
in his courtroom, Judge Jefferson was an established jurist with a law 
degree from the University of Virginia and nearly twenty years on the 
bench.65 A descendant of prominent colonial families on both parental 
lines and, reportedly, an enthusiastic farmer,66 Judge Jefferson was 
likely to attribute deep and perhaps romantic significance to a 
farmer’s connection to his family farm and might have resisted swift, 
potentially spontaneous, and loosely documented land sales. Agrarian 
life enjoyed a glorified status in Virginia society, as many of Virginia’s 
legendary family dynasties were linked to ownership of substantial 
rural estates,67 and Virginia culture held up agrarian ideals, even after 
industrialization started dominating the twentieth-century Southern 
economy.68 
The state supreme court in Richmond, by contrast, may have 
been more concerned with the demands of modern commerce, 
including the alienability of property. Scholars have recognized that 
state supreme courts were very policy oriented, as opposed to 
formalistic, when articulating contract law and, especially, when 
adjudicating land disputes.69 Even while local courts were sensitive to 
 
 64. VIRGINIA LIVES: THE OLD DOMINION WHO’S WHO 507 (Richard Lee Morton ed., 
1964) (“A member of the Democratic Party, Mr. Jefferson served as Chairman of the Amelia 
Democratic Committee.”).  
 65. See id. (“John G. Jefferson, Jr., attended . . . the University of Virginia, from which he 
received his Bachelor of Laws degree in 1908. Engaged in a private law practice from 1908 to 
1938, Mr. Jefferson served as Trial Justice of Amelia and Powhatan Counties from 1934 to 1938, 
and as Judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit from 1938 until his retirement on August 31, 1962.”). 
 66. Id.  
 67. See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 68. See generally TWELVE SOUTHERNERS, I’LL TAKE MY STAND: THE SOUTH AND THE 
AGRARIAN TRADITION (1930) (discussing agrarian idealism and its devoted resistance to 
industrialization across the South); PAUL V. MURPHY, THE REBUKE OF HISTORY: THE 
SOUTHERN AGRARIANS AND AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT 67–68 (2001) (describing 
a debate in Richmond, attended by 3500 people, on the clash of agrarian ideals against 
industrialism); Wayne Mixon, Resistance to Industrialization, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SOUTHERN CULTURE 724, 724–26 (Charles Reagan Wilson & William Ferris eds., 1989) 
(discussing the depth of agrarian attitudes and the impact of both the publication of I’LL TAKE 
MY STAND, supra, and the agrarian literary movement from the Civil War to the early 1970s). 
 69. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 33–34 (1965) (discussing 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s treatment of land transactions between 1826 and 1861 and 
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personal and historical attachments to land, appellate courts—in part 
deliberately aiming to contrast American alienability with feudal 
systems—were deliberately supportive of enforcing land sales and 
encouraging the acquisition of land for commercial development.70 
More broadly, American law during and following the New Deal 
challenged persistent notions of social hierarchy and expanded the 
even-handed enforcement of contract and property rights.71 This 
move toward modernity further greased the wheels of rapid 
commerce and enhanced the alienability of property, including family 
farms. 
The Lucy opinion appears to have been part of this trend. As 
Virginia’s economy became more industrial during the 1950s,72 
nationwide legal reforms that were designed to facilitate commercial 
dealings and the predictability of contractual rights had an acute 
effect in Virginia. The Uniform Commercial Code was introduced for 
the first time to eight state legislatures in the 1950s,73 and Virginia was 
pursuing reforms of its own commercial code.74 Legal reforms 
designed to facilitate commercial transactions would have been a 
much higher priority for the state supreme court than for a regional 
judge—or an avid farmer—in rural Dinwiddie County. 
Judge Jefferson might also contribute to yet another narrative 
that has gained attention among legal historians. Judge Jefferson’s 
dismissive rejection of Lucy’s claims may have simply been the 
product of a deeply rooted Southern tradition in which local judges, 
less concerned about uniform legal principles, assumed the role of 
“maintaining the peace” in local communities.75 Judicial localism 
 
noting that the “judicial attitude toward land cases was . . . strongly colored by considerations of 
public policy” and that “the court examined [the existing legal] system with a critical eye”).  
 70. See id. at 28–29 (describing the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s attitude toward land 
transactions during the same time period). 
 71. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 384–85 
(2002).  
 72. See SOUTHSIDE STUDY COMM., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE VA. ECON., A SURVEY 
OF THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF SIX SOUTHSIDE VIRGINIA COUNTIES 51–55 (1960) 
(summarizing the growth in manufacturing during the 1940s and 1950s).  
 73. William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 8 (1967).  
 74. See, e.g., George D. Gibson & George C. Freeman, Jr., A Decade of the Model Business 
Corporation Act in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 1396, 1396–98 (1967) (describing efforts to 
modernize and codify Virginia corporation law).  
 75. See, e.g., LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH 4 (2009) 
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rested on a loose set of power dynamics and a rough sense of justice 
that “allow[ed] local custom, politics, and law to mingle freely”76 and 
in which “judgments rested on the situated knowledge of observers in 
local communities [largely] through family and neighborly ties and 
continually assessed through gossip networks.”77 Predictably, local 
Southern law was not a technical enterprise and instead “depended 
on information conveyed orally by ordinary people,” with written 
materials serving a secondary role “as a reminder of oral knowledge 
that had determined the process.”78 
Like much of southeast Virginia, Dinwiddie County—for many 
of the reasons discussed in the next Sections—was having more than 
its fair share of land disputes,79 and Judge Jefferson was likely 
alarmed by the litigation and unseemly contracting practices that had 
found their way into his and other courtrooms. His priority, like many 
other local Southern judges, might have been chiefly to maintain the 
stable status quo.80 Judge Jefferson’s terse ruling, lack of legal 
analysis, and sparse justification for maintaining the status quo all 
match the concept of “local peace” in both substance and style.81 
 
(describing the development of this tradition of localism in the Carolinas during the antebellum 
period).  
 76. Id. at 5. 
 77. Id. at 7. 
 78. Id. at 4. 
 79. For a discussion of the significant experience thrust upon southern Virginia’s judges in 
adjudicating land disputes, see infra Part III.D. 
 80. EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 7 (“Keeping the peace meant keeping everyone—from the 
lowest to the highest—in their appropriate places, as defined in specific local contexts. Local 
courts focused on the resolution of these highly personal, idiosyncratic disputes.”). Substantial 
evidence suggests that local judges and court officials were intimately familiar with the litigants 
who appeared in their chambers—and the gossip accompanying their disputes. Id. at 7–8. 
Welford Lucy, Hardy Zehmer, and Hardy Zehmer’s wife, for example, very publicly discussed 
the alleged contract with neighbors—and each other—the day after the contract was signed. 
These discussions took place, of all places, at a house party hosted by the “brother of the 
[Dinwiddie County] Clerk of the Court.” Record, supra note 20, at 26–27, 37–38. A few days 
later, Zehmer argued with Lucy again about the contract, a conversation that occurred “in the 
presence of Judge Barrow.” Record, supra note 20, at 38. Judge B. Hunter Barrow was a county 
judge in Dinwiddie between 1934 and 1970. JONES, supra note 18, at 184. 
 81. Professor Laura Edwards’s description of social stability within a stable and familiar 
community of actors, see, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 7–8, relates to what economists 
might describe as the sustained benefits from continued reciprocity. The local institutions that 
promoted reciprocity in the South were similar to the extralegal mechanisms that early law-and-
society scholars credit for maintaining stable commercial relationships, see Mark Galanter, 
Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 
1, 24 (1981); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AMER. SOC. REV. 55, 63 (1963); to what game theorists modeled as self-sustaining cooperation, 
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This appearance of localism in Judge Jefferson’s ruling could be 
precisely what led to a sharp rebuke from Justice Buchanan. The 
Virginia Supreme Court, like other statewide bodies, likely “aspired 
to create a unified body of law and a centralized institutional 
structure to enforce it.”82 Lucy v. Zehmer was tried at a time when 
advocates of unified notions of law were seeking to limit the 
inconsistency and discretion inherent in decentralized notions of 
justice. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, was attracting 
considerable attention from state courts and legislatures at that time, 
in large part because it aimed to “relegate local tradition, prejudice 
and provincialism to a position secondary to clarity, simplification, 
standardization and uniformity of the laws.”83 Appellate courts often 
imposed principles of law precisely to counter local preferences for 
societal stability. 
Although each of these narratives is independently capable of 
providing a meaningful and revealing new perspective on the story of 
Lucy v. Zehmer, our preferred narrative is more economic in nature. 
We report that Lucy v. Zehmer took place within a rapidly changing 
economic climate that heightened the economic incentives to acquire 
land. Such opportunities to profit quickly from land encouraged 
transactions that both created economic upheaval and facilitated 
dramatic economic transition. The Lucy brothers played active roles 
in this industrial transformation, and our inclination toward an 
economic narrative is guided significantly by our early discovery that 
Welford Lucy was a shrewd and aggressive businessman who, 
reflecting his era, capitalized on an economy in transition and social 
roles in flux. 
 
see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 118–20 (1984); and to what some 
economic historians and institutionalists attributed to the efficacy of prelegal reputation 
mechanisms, see Avner Grief, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: 
The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 525–48 (1993); Paul Milgrom, Doug 
North & Barry Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, 
Private Judges, and the Champaign Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 1–2 (1990). 
 82. EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 4. 
 83. Samuel A. Dew, The Urge for Uniformity in State Laws, 20 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 56, 
62 (1952). 
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II.  THE FARMER AND THE LUMBERMAN 
Some Southern aristocrats, like the Harrisons, could trace the 
ownership of their lands to a royal charter.84 Others, like the dynasty 
founded by Harry F. Byrd, rose to political and social prominence 
through the wise acquisition and management of local lands.85 The 
Zehmers of Dinwiddie County fell somewhere in between. 
At the time of the dispute in Lucy v. Zehmer, the Zehmers had 
been a prominent fixture in Dinwiddie County for more than a 
century. The dynasty began with Captain Charles Zehmer, a Dutch-
German merchant from Philadelphia who was reportedly a member 
of elite circles during colonial times.86 In addition to a fleet of ships, 
Captain Zehmer owned a plantation, a tanning business, and 
extensive land holdings in Virginia and Pennsylvania.87 Upon his 
death, Captain Zehmer left all of his property to his sole heir, a son 
named Charles Grandison Zehmer, who subsequently lost the entire 
estate in a game of cards.88 Charles Grandison later attended medical 
school and returned to his native Dinwiddie County to become a local 
physician.89 There Dr. Zehmer raised eleven children, whose 
descendants prospered in Dinwiddie County for more than a 
century.90 As their prominence grew over time, so did their holdings 
of land.91 
The history of the Zehmer family is very much the history of 
McKenney, the small town in Dinwiddie County where the Zehmers 
 
 84. See Saxon, supra note 38 (noting that Albertis S. Harrison’s “home sat on a tract 
deeded to an ancestor, Henry Harrison, by King George II in 1732”). 
 85. See, e.g., Harry F. Byrd (1887–1966), ENCYCLOPEDIA VA., http://www.encyclopedia
virginia.org/Byrd_Harry_Flood_Sr_1887-1966 (last updated Apr. 7, 2011). Byrd also came from 
an established family of colonial fame, but his purchase and efficient management of apple 
orchards paved the way for his rise to decades-long dominance in Virginia’s political system. Id. 
 86. ROBERTA ZEHMER SMITH, ZEHMER: A FAMILY HISTORY 2–3 (Jane C. Arnett ed., 
1984). 
 87. Id. at 2–4. 
 88. Id. at 3–4, 13. Charles Grandison Zehmer reportedly only bet his life-estate rights on 
the card game, but the property was never returned to the family after his death. Id. at 13–14. 
 89. Id. at 14. 
 90. Id. at 14–16. 
 91. See, e.g., JOHN G. ZEHMER, JR., NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES 
REGISTRATION FORM: ZEHMER FARM, DHR NO. 257-5008, § 8, at 10 (2009) (describing the 
family’s acquisitions of various properties in the McKenney area). Members of the Zehmer 
family are listed as grantees on 386 separate land deeds in Dinwiddie County dated between the 
years 1847 and 1986. 
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lived. Named after William Robertson McKenney,92 a railroad 
attorney from Richmond,93 McKenney was founded around 1900 
when the railroad was built to connect the isolated and rural south of 
Dinwiddie County to the Richmond market to the north.94 Many local 
institutions, such as the local bank, were established during this 
period to meet the sudden demand generated by this growing 
commercial link.95 Among these institutions were several businesses 
established by the Zehmer family,96 businesses that cemented the 
Zehmers’ influence in the town. 
At first, the Zehmers established a sawmill business to cut 
lumber for railroad ties, and, as the railroad pushed deeper into 
Dinwiddie, the Zehmers purchased vast tracts of timberland to keep 
up with the railroad’s needs.97 With a sawmill small enough to move 
from tract to tract, the Zehmers acquired heavily forested properties 
to harvest timber and moved their mill quickly from one property to 
the next.98 This process led the Zehmers to acquire substantial land 
holdings around the outskirts of what became McKenney, solidifying 
their influence as a prominent family in the small town.99  
This business had a natural limit, and the family looked to use its 
land holdings for alternative businesses once the local railroad line 
had been established. In the 1920s, the family began to farm 
tobacco,100 a profitable cash crop at the time.101 Less than twenty years 
later, they supplemented their income by raising cattle, a business 
that was naturally followed by dairy farming.102 As each business 
 
 92. McKenney was a University of Virginia law graduate and former congressman from 
Petersburg. See McKenney, William Robertson (1851–1916), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF 
THE U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000502 (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2012) (providing biographical information about McKenney). 
 93. See Our First 100 Years, BANK OF MCKENNEY, http://www.bankofmckenney.com/index
.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=54 (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (noting 
that McKenney was an attorney for various railroads). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See generally ZEHMER, supra note 91 (listing the businesses established by the 
Zehmers).  
 97. Id. § 8, at 10–11 (recording the expansion of the Zehmer farm).  
 98. See id. § 8, at 11 (noting that there were numerous sawmill sites on the farm).  
 99. See id. § 8, at 10–11 (recording increased acquisitions). 
 100. See id. § 7, at 7. (“Two log, flue-cured tobacco barns, built around 1920, stand near the 
main entrance . . . .”).  
 101. See id. § 8, at 12 (“[T]he primary farming enterprise on the farm was tobacco as a cash 
crop . . . .”). 
 102. Id. § 8, at 13.  
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reached what seemed like its natural limit, other family businesses 
were established, including a local grocery store, a local hardware 
store,103 and, ultimately, Ye Olde Virginnie, the small “tourist court” 
operated by Hardy Zehmer.104  
 
Image 1.  Hardy Zehmer’s Tourist Court105 
 
 
Hardy Zehmer was a farmer born into a well-landed farming 
family, but he also was an educated businessman, attending southern 
Virginia’s prestigious Hampden-Sydney College106 and then briefly 
working for E. I. du Pont de Nemours as the foreman of a munitions 
plant during World War I.107 After the war, Zehmer returned to 
 
 103. Id. § 8, at 11.  
 104. See Ye Olde Virginnie, The One Stop Tourist Court (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). A postcard uncovered by Professor Frank Snyder describes the business as “The One 
Stop Motel” in McKenney, Virginia, with “Individual and Family-type rooms—Air 
conditioned—Steam Heat—Television—Restaurant—Service Station—Garage.” See Frank 
Snyder, Carry Me Back to Ye Olde Virginnie, CONTRACTS PROF BLOG (Feb. 15, 2008), http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2008/02/carry-me-back-t.html.  
 105. Photograph provided by Ronald Seagrave. Original source unknown.  
 106. Both Justice Buchanan and Judge Jefferson attended Hampden-Sydney College. See 
VIRGINIA LIVES, supra note 64, at 132.  
 107. See Adrian Hardy Zehmer, Registration Card No. 4107 (1917) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (recording Zehmer’s place of employment). At the time, the large gun cotton 
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conduct business in his native McKenney, where he quickly 
established a restaurant, service station, motel, and guest cabins.108 
These assorted business ventures primarily catered to travelers along 
Highway 1, the main north-south thoroughfare connecting Maine to 
Florida at the time, and were profitable even during the Depression, 
when so many other local businesses failed. As a measure of his 
success, Zehmer, in a period when many were losing their farms, had 
enough disposable income to buy the Ferguson farm, a property that 
Zehmer had no desire to operate for commercial purposes.109 
In spite, or perhaps because, of Zehmer’s wealth, he had a less-
than-sterling reputation among McKenney’s residents and is 
remembered as having been a colorful character. As one neighbor 
recounted, Zehmer was known for his drinking even before that 
fateful December evening in 1952 and had had several reported run-
ins with state and local officials.110 He also was the town’s leading 
Republican in an age in which most town residents may still have 
thought of the Republican Party as the party of Presidents Lincoln 
and Hoover. The reasons for Zehmer’s political allegiances are not 
entirely clear, but his politics made Zehmer a relative outcast in town 
despite the prominence of his family. This disaffection was evidently 
mutual: Hardy and Ida Zehmer evidently did not consider themselves 
to be “McKenney people,”111 and many McKenney residents 
reportedly felt a similar distance from the Zehmers.112 Perhaps one 
 
factory in Hopewell “employed almost all of the employable labor in that area.” Hercules 
Powder Co. v. Cont’l Can Co., 86 S.E.2d 128, 129 (Va. 1955). 
 108. Snyder, supra note 104. 
 109. See Record, supra note 20, at 24, 41 (providing Ida and Hardy Zehmer’s deposition 
testimony that, at most, several cows had been kept on the farm). A member of the Zehmer 
family also confirmed Hardy Zehmer’s wealth and that he had held the farm as an investment 
rather than as an active business asset. Telephone Interview with a Zehmer Family Member 
(Nov. 23, 2010). 
 110. Interview with Floyd M. Harrison Jr., in Dinwiddie Cnty., Va. (Oct. 15, 2009) 
(recounting stories about times Zehmer’s liquor license had been suspended for excessive 
drinking behind the bar and a time Zehmer, while visiting a friend who called out the local fire 
department, supposedly told the arriving firemen that “the fire [was] in [his] belly”).  
 111. Record, supra note 20, at 27 (“[W]e are out of the corporate limits, and I don’t have too 
much contact with McKenney people.” (quoting Ida Zehmer)). 
 112. See SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 14, at 5 (reporting that the Zehmers “were not ‘well-
liked’” in their community (quoting one of Professor Scott’s students who was from Dinwiddie 
County)).  
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should not be surprised then that Zehmer primarily directed his 
businesses toward those only passing through town.113 
The Lucy brothers came from a world far away from the 
Zehmers’ privilege. Though also born into a farming family—their 
father ran a tobacco farm—the Lucy brothers lost everything when 
their father’s farm went bankrupt in the early years of the 
Depression; and the five Lucy children were left to fend for 
themselves.114 John Cleveland Lucy, Welford’s older brother and a 
coplaintiff, never finished the seventh grade and went to work in the 
lumber industry as a teenager.115 Eventually scraping together enough 
money to buy a small sawmill, John enjoyed the freedom that came 
from running his own business, even though he took on an occasional 
partner on larger projects.116 
In his early years, John bought and cut timber from the land of 
local farmers, financing the purchases with loans and then selling the 
cut timber to local lumber companies at a profit. From the start, he 
relied on one institution in particular—the Farmers and Merchants 
Bank—to finance most of his activities. His agreements with that 
bank were in turn drawn up by the bank’s attorney and one of its 
trustees at the time, a young commonwealth attorney named Albertis 
S. Harrison Jr.117 The bank’s trust in John’s business grew over time, 
as evidenced by the large number of loans it issued to Lucy and his 
 
 113. Whatever the reasons for this mutual distaste, whether it was shared by the Lucy 
brothers is unclear. Indeed, John C. Lucy Jr., the son of coplaintiff John C. Lucy, fondly 
remembers dining at Zehmer’s restaurant as a child and thinking of Hardy Zehmer as “a very 
pleasant man.” Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, in Durham, 
N.C. (July 16, 2009). If the Lucy brothers personally disliked Hardy Zehmer, such feelings were 
not voiced to the rest of their family, leaving the ironic possibility that, at least on the surface, 
the Lucy brothers might have been among the few in the area with a positive view of Hardy 
Zehmer.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. See Email from John C. Lucy III to author (Feb. 17, 2011, 12:56 AM) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (containing comments from Emory Lucy explaining that the “vast majority 
of [John C. Lucy’s] dealings were done on his own” but naming Clyde Delbridge and Shorty 
Jones as two business partners).  
 117. A commonwealth attorney is the local equivalent of a district attorney in Virginia. See 
BUREAU OF MUN. RESEARCH, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA: REPORT ON A SURVEY OF THE CITY 
GOVERNMENT 455 (1917) (stating that the commonwealth attorney was “the prosecuting officer 
of the City of Richmond”). Over the course of his career, Harrison continued to serve as a 
trustee for the Farmers and Merchants Bank. Indeed, his name is listed as trustee on so many 
trust deeds that Brunswick County has an entire Grantee Deed Index just for the Harrison 
family. The Grantee Deed Index is on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
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brothers over the next two decades.118 For many years, John even sat 
on the bank’s board along with Harrison.119 
Welford, unlike his brother, was not content remaining in his 
native Brunswick County. Instead, he looked further north to 
neighboring Dinwiddie County, at first driving a truck for a local 
businessman and then getting into lumber and cattle farming.120 In the 
1940s, he purchased an estate along Highway 1, not too far from 
Zehmer’s tourist court.121 This change marked the first time, but not 
the last time, that Welford would feel the need to move to a new 
community to pursue new business opportunities.122 
Welford arrived in McKenney as an outsider, and although he 
would become a close associate of several residents—including 
Harrison Zehmer, a cousin of Hardy Zehmer who would often spend 
his evenings at Hardy’s restaurant123—views vary as to whether 
Welford ever integrated himself into the area. Some residents recall 
that Lucy was known to be shady with his business and that—like 
many of the county’s lumbermen at the time124—he was eager to make 
 
 118. At the same time, Emory Lucy, one of John C. Lucy’s sons, insists that tracking his 
father’s timber-cutting business just by tracking these loans would be difficult. Instead, he 
believes that his father usually paid for timber to be harvested in cash and only took loans when 
absolutely necessary. Interview with Emory Lucy, in Brunswick Cnty., Va. (Oct. 27, 2009).  
 119. Despite his humble roots, John C. Lucy saw himself as a gentleman. When heading out 
to work in the field, John always wore a full suit, complete with a bow tie. Interview with John 
C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. As one of his sons recalls, he 
even wore the suit for breakfast. Id. Beyond business at the bank, John C. Lucy also developed 
a close bond with Albertis S. Harrison. Id. Although the poorly educated businessman might 
seem a strange match with the well-educated lawyer, John’s descendants recall that the two men 
were close personal friends. Id. The two regularly played golf together, and John C. Lucy in 
particular was a true believer in Harrison and his political skill. Id. Emory Lucy, one of John’s 
sons (who had served as a driver for Harrison during one of his early political campaigns), 
recalls that his father sagely predicted that Harrison would be elected governor long before 
Harrison’s victory in 1962. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118. A loyal Democrat, 
Welford was similarly supportive of Harrison’s political ambitions. Welford’s Dinwiddie farm 
had a large barbeque pit with picnic tables where he hosted political fundraisers for Harrison 
during each election season. Interview with Meade Lucy, in Durham, N.C. (Dec. 10, 2010).  
 120. Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119.  
 121. Id. 
 122. See infra Postscript. 
 123. Interview with Floyd M. Harrison Jr., supra note 110.  
 124. Although Justice Buchanan described Lucy as a “lumberman and farmer,” Lucy v. 
Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 518 (Va. 1954), Lucy’s actual deposition testimony emphasized his 
lumber business, only including “some farming” as though it was an afterthought, Record, supra 
note 20, at 51. 
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quick profits off of the land of others.125  
Although Hardy Zehmer may have prided himself on his 
superior education and business acumen, the region’s economic 
changes were being driven by market forces that extended far beyond 
Zehmer’s tourist court. As we discuss in the next Part, these 
economic changes created new profit opportunities for the 
undereducated but enterprising Lucy brothers, who, despite starting 
with only a small mill, played a significant role in the timber 
economies of Dinwiddie and Brunswick Counties during a period of 
significant industrial expansion. 
III.  TIMBER PRICES, LAND DISPUTES, AND AN  
INDUSTRIAL SHIFT IN THE SOUTH 
When John C. Lucy began his career as a lumberman in the 
1930s, economic trends that had begun in the 1920s and that had 
accelerated throughout the 1950s were rapidly changing the business 
of lumbermen across the American South. During much of this 
period, the lumber industry of southern Virginia—the region’s 
traditional driver of prices for raw-timber resources126—was waning in 
the face of declining demand for southern pine.127 Yet far from 
 
 125. When asked, for instance, whether Welford’s reputation was hurt by the dispute in 
Lucy v. Zehmer, one neighbor—Floyd M. Harrison Jr.—responded with a bluntness 
characteristic of Dinwiddie residents: “What reputation?” Interview with Floyd M. Harrison Jr., 
supra note 110. Welford’s youngest son, Meade Lucy, saw a different side to his father, 
describing Welford as a complicated man who was strict and a bit distant at home but friendly 
and outgoing with most people in the community. Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119. 
As his son recalls, Welford was the kind of person who “never met a stranger.” Id. 
 126. In forestry, “timber” is the raw tree that is harvested. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1172 (1st ed. 1891) (defining “timber” as “[w]ood felled for building or other such use”). Trees 
in the field are often referred to as “standing timber.” See, e.g., Roberts v. Nevel, 140 S.E. 557, 
559 (Va. 1927) (interpreting a contract that used the phrase “standing timber”). “Lumber,” by 
contrast, is a finished product intended for use by an end consumer, such as in the term “lumber 
boards.” See, e.g., id. (explaining the “clear and definite” technical definition of the term 
“lumber” as distinct from the “loose, inaccurate verbiage of the layman”). Although lumber was 
the main product made from timber in the South, making other products (such as “wood pulp”) 
is possible as well. See 7 JOHN GRIMES WALKER, REPORT ON THE ISTHMIAN CANAL 
COMMISSION, 1899–1901, at 522–23 (1904) (noting that the Southern states “furnish[ed] more 
than half of the lumber exported from the United States” but that wood-pulp mills were “mostly 
located in the northeastern part of the United States”). “Wood pulp,” in turn, can be used to 
produce paper. Id. at 522. 
 127. See, e.g., I. James Pikl, Jr., Southern Forest-Products and Forestry: Developments and 
Prospects, 42 J. FARM ECON. 268, 269–71 (1960) (describing the decline in “[l]arge-scale 
lumbering operations” in the South from 1909 to 1958 and the declining demand for southern 
pine due to complaints about its quality).  
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slowing down, business was heating up for lumbermen in the region, 
as industrial leaders addressed weak markets for lumber by investing 
heavily in plants to make wood pulp, a valuable raw material used to 
produce paper.128 The new capacity for paper manufacturing made 
harvesting timber for wood pulp quite lucrative, which in turn created 
a shock to local timber prices.129 Demand for timber spiked as 
companies sought to acquire more timberlands to guarantee their 
timber supplies, and speculation over timberlands spread.130 This 
economic boom provides the context essential to understanding the 
1952 encounter in Zehmer’s restaurant.131 
A. When the Farmer Met the Lumberman: Timber’s Early Years 
The lumber industry has deep roots in southern Virginia, dating 
back to at least 1855.132 Home to many dense forests—and good soil 
for quickly growing pine forests—southern Virginia was a natural 
attraction for lumbermen.133 Whereas early sawmills were isolated 
outposts in an agrarian economy dominated by tobacco plantations, 
the Civil War soon transformed the lumber industry into a more 
powerful force. After the war, farmers devastated by the collapse of 
tobacco and cotton prices were desperate to recover some value from 
effectively defunct family farms and plantation lands. Although 
timberlands were valueless to Southern farmers, Northern 
lumbermen had the machinery and the know-how to harvest and 
bring timber to market.134 Native Virginians soon took to the lumber 
industry as well, realizing that they could pay only a pittance for 
 
 128. See id. at 272 (describing how pulp-and-paper products were displacing lumber 
interests in the South). 
 129. See infra Part III.B. 
 130. See infra Part III.B. 
 131. See infra Part IV. 
 132. See PARKE ROUSE JR., THE TIMBER TYCOONS: THE CAMP FAMILIES OF VIRGINIA 
AND FLORIDA AND THEIR EMPIRE 1887–1987, at 31 (1988) (“[T]he largest and most desirable 
sawmill in southern Virginia . . . . was . . . owned by the brothers R. J. and William Neely, 
formerly of Pennsylvania. It had been started in 1855 by John Frisbee and had shipped lumber 
as far as Düsseldorf and Hamburg.”). 
 133. See id. at 35 (“Nowhere in the world did pine grow better than in the sandy region 
south of the James River in Virginia, beginning at Richmond and extending southward to the 
Neuse River in North Carolina.”). 
 134. See id. at 29 (“To meet the demand for timber, a wave of Northern sawmill operators 
had swept into Virginia after 1865. With forest lands selling for as little as $5 an acre, venturers 
set up many sawmills and began to produce both rough-hewn and finished lumber.”). 
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woodlands and then earn back the purchase price after the first 
harvest of timber.135 
“As a rule,” the circuit court of Brunswick County later wrote, 
“the farmer welcomed the lumberman, who came to buy something 
which, heretofore had never been convertible into ready cash.”136 
Faced with willing sellers of “immense quantities of timber,” 
lumbermen proceeded “to erect large and expensive plants and to 
build railroads into the territory where the timber stood.”137 Within a 
few decades, the local lumber industry was recognized as “one of the 
most important industries of Virginia and of the South.”138 
Investments in extracting southern pine for lumber also paved 
the way for follow-on industries that similarly relied on harvesting 
southern pine, including the important paper-and-pulp industry. 
Paper production began in the South as early as 1878, when the 
Marietta Paper Manufacturing Company of Georgia demonstrated 
that paper could be produced from southern pine,139 and in 1891 the 
Carolina Fibre Company of South Carolina went one step further by 
proving that manufacturing paper from southern-pine wood pulp 
could be commercially viable.140 Although these two plants stood 
largely alone for several decades, pulp-and-paper plants had been 
built across the region by the 1920s.141 The lumbermen of Virginia 
assumed a leading role in these developments,142 and by 1927, Virginia 
companies led the South in annual paper output.143 
 
 135. See id. at 36 (“[Paul Camp of the Camp Manufacturing Company] bought [land] for as 
little as $5 and $10 an acre, often repaying the land costs by the sale of its first timber.”).  
 136. Camp Mfg. Co. v. Young, 14 Va. L. Reg. 89, 99 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1908), rev’d in part, 66 S.E. 
843 (Va. 1910). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. H.J. Malsberger, The Pulp and Paper Industry in the South, 54 J. FORESTRY 639, 639 
(1956). 
 140. Id.  
 141. D.H. Killeffer, Paper Goes South, 30 INDUS. & ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 1110, 1111 
(1938).  
 142. See, e.g., DIANA TWEDE & SUSAN E.M. SELKE, CARTONS, CRATES, AND 
CORRUGATED BOARD: HANDBOOK OF PAPER AND WOOD PACKAGING TECHNOLOGY 58 
(2005) (noting that the plant established by the Hummel-Ross Fibre Company in Hopewell 
began producing kraft linerboard commercially in 1923); Lauren B. Hitchcock, Cellulose in 
Virginia: I—Pulp and Paper, 22 INDUS. & ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 488, 489 (1930) 
(referencing a plant jointly operated by the John H. Heald Company and the Mead Paperboard 
Company in Lynchburg that, shortly before 1930, had expanded into the paper industry); 
Chesapeake Corporation, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/Chesapeake-Corporation-Company-History.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) 
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B. The Post-World War II Boom 
Virginia ranked fifth in national output of wood pulp in 1937,144 
and although the state’s pulp-and-paper industries still lagged behind 
some Northern states, many Virginia companies invested their 
wartime profits in paper manufacturing to close that gap.145 Efforts to 
build up the region’s paper manufacturing accelerated when paper 
demand soared—and lumber demand slumped again—after World 
War II. In 1951, for example, the Camp Manufacturing Company 
invested $2.5 million to build a new paper plant at its Franklin mill 
that drastically increased the company’s production capacities.146 Only 
three years later, the company allocated another $34 million to 
purchase new paper machines for those operations.147 Even companies 
from industries not traditionally tied to timber were investing in the 
newly profitable industry. These new market entrants included the 
 
(discussing the plant opened by the Chesapeake Pulp & Paper Company in West Point, east of 
Richmond). 
 143. Hitchcock, supra note 142, at 489. 
 144. Sven A. Anderson, Trends in the Pulp and Paper Industry, 18 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 195, 
199 (1942). Actual paper production lagged behind wood-pulp production because the early 
Virginia wood-pulp plants were located in Hampton Roads, where shipping lanes provided easy 
access to Northern markets. See Hitchcock, supra note 142, at 489 (“Convenience to both 
northern and southern markets and, through Hampton Roads, to world markets encourages the 
manufacture of any paper commodity whose production is not limited by remote sources of low-
cost bulky raw materials.”). Likewise, many older mills in the Northern states did not make 
their own pulp, relying instead on other sources like the ones in Virginia. See Anderson, supra, 
at 200 (“Many paper mills do not produce their own pulp, but purchase it from various sources. 
In normal times the mills of eastern United States rely very largely upon imported Canadian, 
Scandinavian, and Finnish pulp for their requirements.”).  
 145. See Pikl, supra note 127, at 272 (“With more than two-thirds of the nation’s postwar 
additions to pulping capacity taking place in the South, by 1958 the region was able to boast of 
producing 60 per cent of the country’s woodpulp and more than 40 per cent of its paper and 
paperboard.”). 
 146. Cf. ROUSE, supra note 132, at 161 (“Success in kraft papermaking led Camp 
Manufacturing Company, Inc., in 1951 to build a $2,500,000 plant at Franklin to produce white 
paper from pine. It was another step upward. Housewives preferred white rather than brown 
cartons for milk and frozen foods, and the new white paper technique opened up new 
markets.”). 
 147. See id. at 7–8 (“Hugh Camp delayed moving his residence . . . to complete installation 
of the No. 4 paper machine the Camp board had initiated at his behest in 1954. The huge $34-
million machine dwarfed the three installed earlier . . . . In 1966, after Hugh had become [Union 
Camp’s] chairman, the Franklin mill added its machine No. 5 at a cost of $37 million.”). By 1955, 
observers were already referring to the lumber company as merely the operator of a “paper 
mill” without any mention of its continuing lumber operations. See, e.g., Camp v. Murray, 226 
F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1955).  
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Continental Can Company,148 which purchased a plant in 1947 and 
then invested between $22 million and $25 million to increase the 
plant’s capacity four years later.149 
These investments caused pulp-and-paper operations to expand 
quickly across the South, which by the mid-1950s was home to three-
fifths of the nation’s paper manufacturing capacity.150 Paper 
manufacturers suddenly found their timber inventories understocked 
and sought to expand their woodland holdings quickly to meet 
growing manufacturing demands. The Camp Manufacturing 
Company, for example, expanded its local woodland holdings from 
approximately 106,000 acres in 1936151 to 240,000 acres twenty years 
later.152 Other companies, including many that brought new 
technologies and greater efficiency to paper production, similarly 
sought to acquire more timberlands.153 
Demand for timber was such that state officials and 
manufacturers began fearing an imminent timber shortage in 
southeastern Virginia.154 Timber harvesting and pulp processing were 
 
 148. As its name suggests, the Continental Can Company was primarily a metal-container 
company. See United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 445 (1964) (noting that in 1955 the 
company was “the second largest company in the metal container field,” but that it had also 
acquired numerous other packaging companies, including fourteen separate “producers of 
paper containers and paperboard”). 
 149. Hercules Powder Co. v. Cont’l Can Co., 86 S.E.2d 128 (Va. 1955). 
 150. See Merle Prunty, Jr., Recent Expansions in the Southern Pulp-Paper Industries, 32 
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 51, 51 (1956) (“In 1944, the South was responsible for about 44 per cent of 
domestic pulpwood output. By 1952, total southern production . . . accounted for 58 per cent of 
all United States pulpwood cut. [P]roduction [in 1953] increased to . . . 61 per cent of domestic 
production.”); see also supra note 145. 
 151. Camp Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 467, 468 (1944). In addition to owned land, the 
company also had 15,000 acres of contractual timber rights. Id. 
 152. ROUSE, supra note 132, at 5. 
 153. See id. (“[L]and and timber in the Southern pine belt were growing rapidly in value in 
the 1950s . . . .”); id. at 12 (“[Franklin’s] employment in lumber and paper manufacturing has 
steadily prospered. . . . Timber values have increased, and the purchase of raw materials of all 
sorts, especially timber and pulpwood, has expanded as more and more high-technology 
machines are brought on line.”). 
 154. See Hercules Powder Co., 86 S.E.2d at 131 (“Mr. George W. Dean, State Forester of 
Virginia, testified that the pine situation was ‘acute’, and that on the basis of the latest survey of 
Virginia forests conducted in 1952 by the United States and Virginia Forest Services, the drain, 
or decrease in the Virginia pine, exceeded the growth of pine since 1940 by 16%.”); see also S.J. 
Res. 22, 1954 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1954), reprinted in FOREST RESOURCES OF 
VIRGINIA: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
OF VIRGINIA 7, 7 (1955) (recognizing that “the volume of merchantable timber in Virginia ha[d] 
been shown by recent surveys to have declined at an alarming rate” and creating a commission 
to investigate the decline and develop recommendations for practices and regulatory measures 
that might alleviate the situation).  
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proceeding at such a rate that mills were attracting new workers faster 
than the area’s housing supply could keep pace.155 The rise in demand 
for timber led to a dramatic rise in timber prices, which naturally led 
to a corresponding escalation of land prices across the southern pine 
belt.156 By then, the pulp-and-paper industry was already on its way to 
becoming the third-largest producer of wealth in the South.157 Thus, 
despite rising land and timber prices, the industry continued 
purchasing vast quantities of timber, investing in new timberlands, 
and even increasing processing capacity. 
Figure 1.  Rapid Increase in Market Price for Southern Pine158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 155. See Camp v. Murray, 226 F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1955) (“The post war increase of the 
[Camp Manufacturing Company] in 1947 led the company to bring many new employees to 
Franklin and a critical shortage of house sites arose because none were available in the town 
and the adjacent lands were owned by members of the Camp and other families who declined to 
sell.”). In 1948, under increasing pressure, Hugh G. Camp, a company vice president, was 
reluctantly persuaded to sell his own personal farmland to be used as residential land for town 
newcomers and Camp’s new workers. Id. at 931–32. 
 156. See supra note 153. The market value of the Ferguson farm appears to have mirrored 
these trends. In 1938, a judicial sale priced the farm at $3600. Deed, supra note 60, at 600, 600. 
In 1943, Zehmer purchased it for $11,000. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 518 (Va. 1954) 
(“[Zehmer] bought this farm more than ten years ago for $11,000.”); Record, supra note 20, at 
56 (acknowledging that Ferguson had conveyed the deed to Zehmer in 1943). About three years 
later, Lucy—in his first attempt to purchase the farm—offered Zehmer $20,000. See Lucy, 84 
S.E.2d at 518 (“Seven or eight years ago [Lucy] had offered Zehmer $20,000 for the farm which 
Zehmer had accepted, but the agreement was verbal and Zehmer backed out.”). In 1952, the 
allegedly agreed-upon price was $50,000. Id. at 517. 
 157. See Malsberger, supra note 139, at 639 (“The pulp and paper business in the 
South . . . rank[ed] as about the third largest wealth producer [in 1956].”). 
 158. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RESOURCE BULLETIN NO. FPL 11, TRENDS IN ECONOMIC 
SCARCITY OF U.S. TIMBER COMMODITIES 4 (1982), available at http://www.fpl.fs.fed.us/
documnts/fplrb/fplrb11.pdf (listing prices in 1967 dollars for one thousand board feet of timber).  
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As these companies pursued standing timber across vast new 
tracts of land, they recognized the potential public outcry in 
communities encroached upon by the paper industry’s expanding 
reach.159 For a variety of reasons, the industry ultimately followed a 
business model that relied on middlemen to obtain the timber 
resources necessary to sustain its tremendous growth—a strategy that 
would eventually bring Lucy and Zehmer face-to-face over drinks a 
few nights before Christmas in 1952. 
C. Southern Industry and Southern Law: The Rise of the Timber 
Broker 
Almost from the very beginning of the South’s lumber and paper 
industries, the law played an important role in determining industrial 
profits and, subsequently, in shaping the business strategies of large 
mill operators. 
As the lumber industry took hold at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, it confronted a serious logistical challenge that 
stymied its growth. The local pattern of landownership was highly 
decentralized, with most timberlands belonging to small family 
landholders, and thus posed considerable obstacles to mill operators’ 
ability to access the region’s forests. In 1908, the circuit court of 
Brunswick County described the problem: “the territory in southside 
Virginia is so divided into ownerships of small tracts, that it is 
 
 159. The feared outcry could be compared to the similar political agitation and revolts 
caused by the English enclosure movements between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
As Professor Allison Dunham suggests, early enclosure movements in England were less 
controversial, and less forceful, than later efforts: 
[G]iven the apparent economic desirability of consolidation of agricultural operations 
in England, the destruction of the system of villages and fields and the voluntary 
allocation of the rural land of England to consolidated argricultural [sic] uses resulted 
from the normal operation of the market mechanism. Consents were obtained by 
purchase and the self-interest of the farmers. 
Allison Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1238, 1241–42 (1960). By the late eighteenth century, however, the amount of land being 
enclosed led some local farmers to resist enclosure efforts even when market forces offered 
strong incentives for farmers to agree to them. As Dunham explains,  
Rural conservatism, as some of the English literature described it, finally produced a 
situation where not all of those who had rights to pasture in the common waste land 
would consent to its enclosure, or at least consent at prices which the majority, even 
given the economic advantage of enclosure, could afford to pay. 
Id. at 1242. 
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necessary to purchase from hundreds of farmers in order to justify the 
erection of a modern saw-mill plant.”160 
The region’s large mill operators handled the problem of 
decentralized land ownership by negotiating a web of standard 
contracts securing the right to harvest and transport standing timber 
from hundreds of small property owners.161 Although individual 
contracts often involved small quantities of timber, litigation over 
even the smallest timber deeds consumed a considerable amount of 
time for large mill operators.162 The widespread use of standard 
timber contracts also often raised large operators’ stakes in even the 
smallest disputes because an unfavorable precedent affecting the 
interpretation of key contract provisions could provide ammunition 
to other farmers seeking similar redress—multiplying the company’s 
potential losses well beyond the amount of timber on any single 
farm.163 
Early on, Virginia’s highest court appeared unsympathetic to 
these concerns. In 1910, for example, the Virginia Supreme Court 
chided the circuit court in Brunswick for taking “judicial notice of the 
operations of a large manufacturing concern”164 and showing undue 
deference to a large mill operator because of its importance to the 
local economy.165 Perhaps because of these challenges, some mill 
operators soon began purchasing local timberlands outright rather 
 
 160. Camp Mfg. Co. v. Young, 14 Va. L. Reg. 89, 99 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1908), rev’d in part, 66 S.E. 
843 (Va. 1910).  
 161. See generally id. (noting the importance of contracts with individual farmers to the 
paper business). 
 162. See, e.g., ROUSE, supra note 132, at 48 (“Like other lumber-cutters, Camp was 
frequently in court in cases contesting the boundaries of its timberlands. Such litigation usually 
grew out of ill-defined property lines on recorded land plats, some dating back to colonial years. 
Often such landmarks as large trees cited by early surveyors had disappeared, creating 
confusion. Especially troublesome was legal title to remote woodlands, . . . which had rarely 
been timbered.”). 
 163. Young, 14 Va. L. Reg. at 90 (explaining that two consolidated test cases were 
particularly important because the questions raised about the standard timber deeds used by the 
Camp Manufacturing Company involved “principles which can arise in more than one hundred 
other cases, and which will settle the title to standing timber valued at perhaps more than one 
million dollars”).  
 164. Id. 
 165. See Young v. Camp Mfg. Co., 66 S.E. 843, 847–48 (Va. 1910) (“[W]e cannot think that 
the rights of the appellants should be controlled by the magnitude of the business in which the 
Camp Manufacturing Company is engaged. . . . [T]he rights of appellants are not to be measured 
by the convenience or inconvenience, the ability or the inability, of the Camp Manufacturing 
Company, caused by and resulting from the magnitude and extent of its business, and its 
numerous other contracts to which these appellants are strangers.”). 
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than purchasing the standing timber on these properties.166 But even 
land purchases brought litigation risks.167 
Anticipating the hazards from litigation, and hoping to avoid 
further cumbersome relations with local landowners, mill operators 
such as the Camp Manufacturing Company began to rely increasingly 
on local family-owned lumber companies to supply their timber 
needs.168 These lumbermen worked as middlemen to help the mill 
operators acquire timber rights in peripheral regions without 
alarming local residents.169 When legal disputes arose, these local 
middlemen also presented the courts with more sympathetic parties.170 
Relying on local lumbermen had the additional benefit of keeping 
land acquisitions quiet, which proved to be useful when land was 
undervalued. The use of middlemen transformed the industry’s 
structure and had meaningful consequences for the region’s smaller 
lumbermen, including the Lucy brothers. 
 
 166. See generally CAMP MFG. CO., SIXTY YEARS OF PROGRESS (1948) (detailing the 
company’s boasts that by the late 1940s, Camp’s lumber and paper operations relied almost 
exclusively on timber cut from repeated harvests on company-owned lands).  
 167. See Camp Mfg. Co. v. Green, 106 S.E. 394, 400 (Va. 1921) (holding that a suit against 
Camp Manufacturing Company was only prevented by the lapse of time between the injury and 
the action); Seward v. Camp Mfg. Co., 71 S.E. 614, 617 (Va. 1911) (concluding that the Camp 
Manufacturing Company had a right to some, but not all, of the land it had purchased).  
 168. See, e.g., Mitch Zemel, Va. Grows Growth Industry, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 10, 
1990, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 9002100828 (referencing the “many small logging 
companies, which stay in business by getting contracts to cut trees from the . . . Union Camps of 
the industry”).  
 169. Concerns about industrial landgrabs alarming local residents were far from 
hypothetical. Rural communities were particularly sensitive to industry efforts to secure wide 
swaths of farming territories. See Prunty, supra note 150, at 52–53 (“Despite efforts to avoid 
undue local concentrations of ownership, some have occurred and criticism has resulted.”). 
 170. This strategy was apparently successful in shielding Camp Manufacturing Company 
from litigation. In spite of the company’s several legal battles in the early 1900s, we could not 
find a single Virginia Supreme Court case involving timber or land purchases to which the 
Camp Manufacturing Company or its successor company, the Union-Camp Bag Company, was 
a party from 1936 to 1956. An exhaustive search of cases in state and federal courts in the 1940s 
and 1950s only turns up one case involving the Camp Manufacturing Company and disputed 
rights to timber, heard before a federal district court in 1942 in South Carolina. See Nelson v. 
Camp Mfg. Co., 44 F. Supp. 554, 557 (E.D.S.C. 1942) (considering a trespass action in which 
Camp Manufacturing Company was the defendant). This is in spite of the company’s substantial 
growth during that period; the company more than doubled its land ownership and timber 
intake. See Camp Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 467, 468 (1944) (“In 1936 petitioner owned in fee 
approximately 106,000 acres of timber lands and held timber rights in 15,000 additional acres.”); 
see also supra note 152 and accompanying text. Indeed, to our knowledge, none of the major 
industrial leaders of the Southern pulp-and-paper industry litigated cases with farmers over 
timber or land before the Virginia Supreme Court in those years. 
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As the pulp-and-paper industry began to displace the lumber 
industry in the late 1940s, it also inherited the lumber industry’s 
problems. First and foremost among those problems was the region’s 
divided land ownership. In the words of a contemporary source, 
  The small landowner is the key to the future of the pulp and 
paper industry in the South. The industry does not own enough land 
to support itself, and for the future it appears as though industry 
must expect the small landowner to supply 50 percent of its total 
requirements. This small landowner looms very large and important 
whenever southern forestry is deliberated.171 
By the mid-1950s, pulp-and-paper manufacturers purchased 75 
percent of their timber requirements from local landowners.172 
Industrial leaders grew increasingly aggravated, however, by the low 
productivity of forests controlled by small landowners as compared to 
lands owned by industrial interests,173 so pulp-and-paper companies 
across the South preferred instead to acquire more direct control over 
Southern timber and timberlands.174 
A second familiar problem was the farmers’ “sensitiv[ity] to the 
manner in which markets for wood-stuffs conduct themselves.”175 
Thus, corporate leaders feared that sudden acquisitions of large tracts 
of land, in addition to driving up purchase prices, would anger the 
same local farmers upon whom they relied for a majority of their 
timber resources.176 Mill owners of the 1950s, like their predecessors 
forty years earlier, navigated these straits by trying to mask their 
acquisitions of additional timberlands, both by looking to more 
 
 171. Malsberger, supra note 139, at 642.  
 172. See id. at 641 (noting, in a source dated 1956, that the industry bought 75 percent of its 
raw materials on the open market). As late as 1990, these private-property owners were still 
providing more than 70 percent of the timber required by Virginia’s timber-consuming 
industries. Zemel, supra note 168.  
 173. See Malsberger, supra note 139, at 641 (comparing productivity rates for industrial 
forests, rated as high as 96 percent, to the rates for individual tracts of land, rated as low as 40 
percent). 
 174. See Prunty, supra note 150, at 52 (“Customarily these mills have obtained ownership 
(or control through long-term leases) of sufficient nearby woodland to insure annual pulpwood 
production equivalent to approximately one-third of mill requirements.”). These attempts were 
ultimately successful. See Zemel, supra note 168 (noting that by 1990, “[m]any larger companies 
rel[ied] heavily on their own timberland”). 
 175. Prunty, supra note 150, at 53. 
 176. This was more than a hypothetical fear. A local commentator observed that “[d]espite 
efforts to avoid undue local concentrations of ownership, some have occurred and criticism has 
resulted.” Id. at 52–53. 
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remote sources of timber where their activities might arouse less 
concern and by employing middlemen to conceal the true purposes of 
land or timber transactions. A report issued by the state’s commission 
on forest resources in 1955, for example, describes the rise of 
“pulpwood contractors” who did “the great majority of cutting [of 
timber] in Virginia . . . predominantly on small ownerships of farmers 
and non-resident investors.”177 These contractors—alternatively 
described as “timber broker[s]”178—formed networks of individual 
lumbermen who acquired timber rights and then harvested timber for 
the state’s large and rapidly expanding pulping operations. As such, 
several small family-owned businesses whose core businesses 
previously had been harvesting timber and producing lumber 
products transformed themselves from independent manufacturers to 
middlemen who profited by searching for and securing raw timber 
materials for Virginia’s burgeoning pulpwood operations.179 
This strategy, when coupled with rapidly rising timber and 
timberland prices, had the unintended result of inspiring an 
unrestrained landgrab. The combination of rising land values and the 
proliferation of aggressive middlemen led to an explosion of quickly 
executed and wildly unseemly property sales. Many sales involved 
shady practices and little disclosure, often causing family sellers to 
agree to prices far below prevailing market rates. A study 
commissioned by the Virginia legislature found the problem to be 
sufficiently problematic to conclude that sawmill operators “ha[d] 
taken full advantage of the landowner’s ignorance of timber 
matters.”180 Several of these disputes over rapid land sales resulted in 
litigation and left behind a colorful legal history. 
D. The Timber Broker and the Courtroom 
As early as the late 1920s, and especially in the booming 1940s 
and 1950s, the Virginia Supreme Court regularly heard cases between 
local landowners, individual lumbermen, and local lumber 
companies.181 These cases often pitted neighbors, families, and even 
 
 177. FOREST RESOURCES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 154, at 28.  
 178. Owen v. Wade, 37 S.E.2d 759, 760 (Va. 1946).  
 179. See Zemel, supra note 168 (describing how small family businesses survived by 
supplying large pulp-and-paper producers with timber). 
 180. FOREST RESOURCES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 154, at 50. 
 181. Between 1926 and 1957, the Virginia Supreme Court decided at least thirty-seven 
cases—in addition to Lucy v. Zehmer—that involved disputes over timber or timberlands. See, 
e.g., Barnes v. Moore, 98 S.E.2d 683, 687 (Va. 1957) (affirming a judgment of willful trespass 
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former business partners against each other over the control of the 
region’s trees and timberlands. Even the early history of the Ferguson 
farm contributed to this line of land disputes. After M.L. Ferguson, 
an elderly widow, bequeathed the property in nine equal shares to 
members of her family, one of those family members, Dr. J.H. 
Ferguson, offered to buy the remaining interests from the others.182 
Three ultimately agreed to sell, and Dr. Ferguson sued the remaining 
five for their shares.183 Represented by William Earle White, a 
prominent local attorney, Dr. Ferguson successfully persuaded the 
court to order a judicial sale of the property in which he, in the “best 
interest of all parties in interest,” would pay $2000 to be divided 
between the five holdouts.184 Five years later, Dr. Ferguson sold the 
 
against a neighbor who cut the plaintiff’s timber); Raney v. Barnes Lumber Corp., 81 S.E.2d 
578, 586–87 (Va. 1954) (finding no contract between a plaintiff lumber company and the heirs to 
an owner of timberlands); Goin v. Absher, 53 S.E.2d 50, 53 (Va. 1949) (overturning a trial court 
judgment that a lumberman had properly exercised an option to extend a timber deed); Kiser v. 
W.M. Ritter Lumber Co., 18 S.E.2d 319, 320 (Va. 1942) (reviewing an action by heirs to recover 
damages from timber removal after a company entered a contract with an incapacitated 
landowner); Brunswick Land Corp. v. Perkinson, 151 S.E. 138, 141 (Va. 1930) (affirming 
trespass by a neighbor who removed trees from the plaintiff’s property); Morriss v. White, 131 
S.E. 835, 840 (Va. 1926) (finding no cause of action for reimbursement of the value of timber 
that had been removed before the property had been conveyed to the plaintiff). The North 
Carolina Supreme Court heard similar cases. In Roberson v. Williams, 83 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. 
1954), which occurred just across Virginia’s southern border, a lumberman—after repeatedly 
trying to buy rights to timber on a widow’s farm, id. at 811—finally induced the widow to sell 
those rights with assurances that $10,000 was a “good price,” id. at 814–15. Forty-nine days later, 
the lumberman sold the same rights to a lumber company for nearly double that price. Id. at 
811–12. When the widow discovered the difference in prices, she filed suit for actionable fraud. 
Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court ultimately held that when a widow had been told that 
she was being offered a “good price,” and those words had induced her to part with her 
property for half its value, the widow was entitled to present her case to a jury. Id. at 811, 815. 
 182. Ferguson v. Ferguson (Va. Cir. Ct. Dinwiddie County 1938) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). This document is available on page 501 of the Dinwiddie County Chancery Order 
Book No. 4. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. In resolving the suit, William Earle White was appointed special commissioner to 
arrange the sale, which was accomplished by deed on December 14, 1938; pursuant to the sale, 
Dr. Ferguson officially took control over the farm for the sum of $2000. See Deed, supra note 
156, at 600–01 (“This deed, made this 14th day of December, in the year 1938, by and between 
William Earle White, Special Commissioner, party of the first part, and J. H. Ferguson, party of 
the second part. . . . Whereas, the court by a decree . . . accepted and confirmed the offer of J. H. 
Ferguson for the purchase of the hereinafter described real estate for the sum of two thousand 
dollars . . . .”). It should be noted that there was reportedly a “poor market for timber” in 
1938—the year of the judicial sale. See Straley v. Fisher, 10 S.E.2d at 551, 552–54 (Va. 1940) 
(explaining why a lumberman had not removed all the timber between February and December 
1938, as he had been authorized to do under a contract). 
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farm to Zehmer for $11,000.185 
Several other land disputes also resulted in lively litigation, and 
one person who regularly was at the fore of that litigation was 
Harrison. After becoming a state senator, but before his election as 
Virginia’s attorney general, Harrison frequently represented parties 
in disputes over southern Virginia land. Harrison, for instance, was 
the lead defense attorney in Jackson v. Seymour,186 a case that has 
appeared in textbooks for at least as long as Lucy v. Zehmer187 and 
that has been cited to demonstrate principles related to 
unconscionability,188 fiduciary duties,189 and constructive fraud.190 
Jackson involved a widow who, after having sold her family land to 
her brother, discovered that her brother had profited handsomely 
from harvesting timber on the land.191 After the brother refused to 
share the profits with his sister—or even to disclose to her what those 
profits had been, though it was later revealed that they approached 
ten times the land’s sale price192—that widow, Lucy S. Jackson, 
retained an attorney to take her brother to court for fraud.193 After 
Harrison successfully defended the contract at trial, Jackson appealed 
to the Virginia Supreme Court, which—though agreeing with 
Harrison that Jackson had failed to prove actual fraud—took pity on 
the widow and ordered the contract rescinded and damages paid to 
 
 185. Deed, supra note 50, at 167; Record, supra note 20, at 34 (recording testimony from 
Zehmer about how much he had paid when he originally bought the farm). 
 186. Jackson v. Seymour, 71 S.E.2d 181 (Va. 1952). 
 187. See PATTERSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 306 (discussing Jackson v. Seymour in a 
casebook dated 1957). 
 188. See, e.g., Note, Unconscionable Business Contracts: A Doctrine Gone Awry, 70 YALE 
L.J. 453, 453 & n.3 (1961) (citing Jackson v. Seymour as an example of “courts hav[ing] 
protected widows and simpletons from the machinations of sharp traders by finding that gross 
inadequacy of consideration has made a contract ‘unconscionable’ and therefore 
unenforceable”). 
 189. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1249 & n.241 (1983) (mentioning Jackson v. Seymour as an example of an 
opinion that straddles the line between “treat[ing] a case as an arm’s-length transaction subject 
to contract law” and “treat[ing] it as a relationship calling for the application of fiduciary 
principles”). 
 190. See, e.g., Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him?, 
34 HASTINGS L.J. 747, 748 n.8 (1983) (using Jackson v. Seymour to support the proposition that 
“[t]he doctrine of constructive fraud requires a special relationship between the parties”). 
 191. Jackson, 71 S.E.2d at 182–84. 
 192. See id. at 183 (noting that Jackson received $275 for the land, that Seymour cut 148,055 
feet of timber from his lands at a stumpage value of about twenty dollars per 1000 feet, and that 
a majority of the timber came from the land he had purchased from Jackson). 
 193. Id. at 184. 
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the plaintiff under a new cause of action known as constructive 
fraud.194 
Several years later, Harrison was also the lead plaintiff’s attorney 
in Barnes v. Moore,195 a case that arose out of negotiations over a tract 
of property between two lumbermen, Barnes and Cabiness, and a 
man named Love.196 Barnes, reportedly a “man of honesty and 
integrity,”197 was trolling Victoria County for timberlands with 
Cabiness when the two “found Love near his home.”198 Eager to 
purchase Love’s land, Cabiness “obtained a bottle of whiskey for 
Love, and after the latter had taken a drink, they began 
negotiations.”199 Eventually, they reached a deal, and the lumbermen 
began cutting and removing the timber.200 
In a predictable plot twist, Barnes and Cabiness discovered that 
Love did not actually own the property in question,201 and the real 
landowners retained Harrison to sue the lumbermen for trespass for 
taking timber from their lands.202 Harrison argued, and the Virginia 
Supreme Court agreed, that the lumbermen had acted with gross 
negligence.203 Noting that “Barnes and Love were kinsmen,” the court 
chided Barnes for exploiting a member of his own community and for 
doing business upon such shaky grounds.204 In the end, the court 
 
 194. Id. at 184–86. 
 195. Barnes v. Moore, 98 S.E.2d 683 (Va. 1957). 
 196. Id. at 684–85. 
 197. Id. at 686. 
 198. Id. at 685. The court was presumably referring to the incorporated town of Victoria in 
Lunenburg County, Virginia, which is a one-hour drive from McKenney along State Highway 
40. That route would take a visitor directly through the Ferguson farm because Highway 40 runs 
directly across the property. Record, supra note 20, at 17. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 683–84. 
 203. Id. at 687. The justification for finding that the lumbermen had been grossly negligent 
in swiftly executing such a land sale comes from the court’s description of Love: 
He was eighty-two years of age, blind in one eye, with defective vision in the other, 
and feeble both physically and mentally. He had given up his business affairs about 
ten years ago, and such matters were attended to by his wife and other members of 
his family. He was kindly disposed, addicted to drinking alcoholic beverages 
whenever available, and easily influenced by other people, especially when 
drinking. . . . These conditions surrounding Love were generally known in his 
community. 
Id. at 685–86. 
 204. Id. at 686–87. 
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ordered the lumbermen to pay damages to the real landowners,205 and 
Love suffered no consequences from enjoying his free drink. 
In between these two representations, Harrison represented the 
Lucy brothers in Lucy v. Zehmer. Together, the three cases paint a 
colorful picture of disputed land sales between eager and, at times, 
unscrupulous purchasers and landowners unaware of their land’s 
unrealized value. They further illustrate how an economic shock to 
asset prices can insert a wedge—and litigation—into intimate social 
and family relations. The cases also suggest that Zehmer’s 
negotiations with Lucy took place within a distinct economic context. 
The region’s large industrial concerns created valuable economic 
opportunities for land purchasers, and although many farmers were 
unaware of the land’s worth, many others understood that the timber 
they owned was rising in value. As the region’s mills used local 
intermediaries to acquire timber resources, aggressive middlemen 
trolling for land sales proliferated in the county’s farmlands and often 
found themselves defending their business practices in court. As we 
describe in the next Part, the Lucy brothers had a lucrative run 
working as such middlemen, and their journey to the Virginia 
Supreme Court began with a plan to obtain what they believed was 
the crown jewel of Dinwiddie’s vast timber reserves: the aged 
timberlands located on the Ferguson farm. 
IV.  NOT JUST A TALE OF TWO LUMBERMEN 
In part, Lucy v. Zehmer is a tale of two brothers in southern 
Virginia who, like the Camps—and even the Zehmers—before them, 
made a fortune by buying undervalued forested properties in remote 
areas and selling the timber from those properties for more money 
than they had paid for the land as a whole. The Lucys’ rise to 
prosperity, however, was a distinct reflection of the region’s 
industrialization, as the brothers capitalized on the regional mills’ 
need for timber brokers. The brothers thus contributed to the 
transformation of southern Virginia’s economy from one that relied 
on farming to one that rested on harvesting natural resources for 
industrial use. 
 
 205. Id. at 684, 687. These cases also demonstrate Harrison’s versatility as an attorney. In 
Barnes v. Moore, Harrison represented landowners and convinced the Virginia Supreme Court 
to rule against the allegedly irresponsible or unethical practices of timber harvesters. In Lucy v. 
Zehmer, by contrast, Harrison convinced the same court that a contract should be upheld on 
behalf of a timber harvester against a purportedly irresponsible landowner. 
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A. The Secret to the Lucys’ Success 
Property records reveal that the Lucy brothers signed dozens of 
land and timber deeds between the 1930s and the 1960s.206 Though 
generally involving properties smaller than the 471.6-acre Ferguson 
farm, these deeds reflect a pattern of business activity in Dinwiddie 
and Brunswick Counties: The Lucy brothers would purchase 
farmland and then harvest the timber for sale to the Camp 
Manufacturing Company or another large paper mill. Sometimes the 
Lucys would resell the land after removing the timber, but often the 
immediate returns from harvesting would enable the Lucys to keep 
much of the land.207 
Engaging in such activity required a keen eye for “cruising,” the 
process of strolling through a property to determine the value of its 
timber, and the descendants of John and Welford Lucy described 
Welford as a true master of the trade.208 Cruising usually involved 
taking careful measurements of a land’s timber and making 
calculations based on market prices, but Lucy family lore describes 
Welford as someone who could stroll around a property and 
intuitively make an accurate assessment of its value.209 In fact, 
Welford admitted in a deposition that he had driven around Zehmer’s 
property several times in the years prior to making his offer of 
$50,000 in December 1952, including one trip three weeks before the 
disputed sale.210 Those trips suggest that Welford’s eventual offer was 
based on a reasoned analysis of the value of the property’s timber 
rather than on an impulsive wager. 
 
 206. In Dinwiddie County alone, Welford and John C. Lucy are listed as grantees on at least 
thirty-four separate land or timber deeds and as grantors on fifty-one such deeds. Indices of 
these deeds are on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
 207. John C. Lucy’s descendants recalled that he, especially, saw value in accumulating as 
much land as possible, instructing his sons, “Buy land if you can, because it is the one 
commodity that God is no longer making.” Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, 
and James Lucy, supra note 113. By adhering to that philosophy, John C. Lucy was able to leave 
thousands of acres of rural land to his sons when he passed away. Id.  
 208. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118; Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. 
Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113; Interview with John C. Lucy III and John C. Lucy IV 
(Feb. 16, 2007); Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119; see also Timber Cruising, U.S. 
FOREST SERV., http://www.fs.fed.us/fmsc/measure/cruising/index.shtml (last updated Aug. 30, 
2011) (“Cruising is the process of measuring forest stands to determine stand characteristics, 
such as average tree sizes, volume, and quality. The primary purpose of cruising is to obtain a 
volume estimation to appraise and prepare timber sales.”). 
 209. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113; 
Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119.  
 210. Record, supra note 20, at 61–62. 
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Lumbermen like the Lucys profited not only from intuitive 
cruising but also from fostering continuing relationships with the 
region’s mills. When the Camp Manufacturing Company needed to 
expand its reach farther into Brunswick and Dinwiddie Counties, for 
example, it turned to John C. Lucy and other lumbermen to purchase 
new land and then turn over the timber.211 John first entered the 
lumber business on his own, scraping together enough money for a 
small sawmill.212 Before long, his descendants recalled, the Camp 
Manufacturing Company had reached out to him to be their “wood 
agent” in Brunswick County, offering him set prices for all timber 
shipped.213 John’s frequent business with Camp led him to build a 
lumberyard in Brunswick County from which he sent regular 
shipments of timber to the company by train.214 It was a good business 
John C. Lucy Jr. recalls; it was “just like picking money off trees.”215 
B. Answering the $50,000 Question 
Both the region’s economic history and the parties’ personal 
histories clarify the events that surrounded Lucy’s meeting with 
Zehmer shortly before Christmas in 1952. They also help illuminate 
the court’s determination that $50,000 was a fair price for the 
Ferguson farm. Timber prices, and thus timberland prices, were 
skyrocketing, and neither historic prices nor the tax assessment values 
relied upon by the court accurately reflected appropriate timberland 
values. In fact, the Ferguson farm’s history leading up to 1952 had 
contributed to its growing value. 
Owned by a widow, then by an absentee landlord, and then by 
nonlumberman Zehmer, the farm’s forests had been allowed to grow 
 
 211. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118; Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. 
Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113.  
 212. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118; Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. 
Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113.  
 213. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. 
 214. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118. John C. Lucy Jr. believed that the 
arrangement had begun with an oral contract under which Camp agreed to pay John C. Lucy 
Sr., one dollar for every cord of pulp wood shipped each week. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., 
John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. He estimated that his father had been one of 
Camp’s largest agents, sending between 50,000 and 60,000 cords of timber a year. Id. The 
Virginia Department of Forestry defines a cord as the amount of wood contained in a space of 
128 cubic feet when the pieces are stacked compactly in touching, parallel rows. Firewood for 
Home Heating, VA. DEP’T OF FORESTRY, http://www.dof.virginia.gov/mgt/firewood.htm (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2012). A “standard cord” measures four feet high, four feet wide, and eight feet 
long. Id. 
 215. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. 
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unharvested for decades. As a result, the farm “was an excellent tract 
of timber,”216 a fact supported by several depositions in the appellate 
record.217 S.E. Winn Jr., a local sawmill operator, testified that he had 
made several past attempts to buy the farm, including an attempt to 
buy its timber in December 1952, shortly before Welford made his 
offer.218 John Will Rives, a local game warden, reported having had “a 
number of conversations” with Zehmer about “the saw timber” on 
the property.219 Zehmer himself testified that he had turned down 
twenty-five similar offers for the farm.220 
Welford and his brother, who were operating lucrative 
businesses as timber brokers for southern Virginia’s large pulp-and-
paper interests, were ideally positioned to capitalize on the land’s 
value. They had a history of harvesting timber for paper companies 
and of buying and selling timberlands for healthy profits, and their 
business success was sufficient to give them access to credit lines that 
were apparently beyond the imagination of Zehmer.221 They might 
reasonably have been able to extract the most value from the farm, 
and thus might have been able to offer a price sufficiently higher than 
any competing broker—a price that would have surprised Zehmer. 
 
 216. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. In 
addition, one neighbor reports that the property was not particularly valuable as a farm, but that 
it was valuable instead as a relatively untouched forest. Interview with Floyd M. Harrison Jr., 
supra note 110. 
 217. Record, supra note 20, at 82–85. 
 218. Id. at 82–83. 
 219. Id. at 84–85. 
 220. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d. 516, 518 (Va. 1954). Zehmer testified that he had told Lucy 
that he was turning down the offers because he “want[ed his] son to have [the farm].” Id. at 520 
(quoting Zehmer). Zehmer’s insistence on leaving the lands untouched for his son could be seen 
as a Zehmer family tradition, but more likely, Zehmer was retaining an asset growing in value 
for when he or his son needed capital. Other family members also reportedly let their 
timberlands sit except when funds were needed—for example, to pay the college tuitions of 
their children. ZEHMER, supra note 91, § 8, at 11.  
 221. One neighbor, Floyd M. Harrison Jr., reports that Zehmer had thought Lucy was 
bluffing about his ability to get $50,000, but that Zehmer had known that he had been cheated 
as soon as Lucy came forward with the money. Interview with Floyd M. Harrison Jr., supra note 
110. Another neighbor, who was at the other end of the counter at Ye Olde Virginnie when 
Lucy met Zehmer in 1952, believes that Zehmer had known that Welford Lucy did not have the 
money to back up his offer, but that Zehmer had forgotten about Welford’s brother, John 
Cleveland. Telephone Interview with Roper Howard (Oct. 15, 2009). This explanation sits well 
with John Cleveland’s descendants. See, e.g., Email from John C. Lucy III to author, supra note 
116 (containing comments from Emory Lucy explaining that he “ha[d] always been under the 
impression that [John Cleveland had] guaranteed a portion of the funds because Uncle Welford 
could not come up with it on his own”).  
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In addition, Lucy’s exceptional talent for appraising timber value 
without conducting extensive measurements allowed him uniquely to 
estimate the farm’s potential value. The record suggests that the 
Zehmers, by contrast, thought little of the land’s natural resources—
or at least that they were much less attuned to the land’s timber value 
than the nearby community of lumbermen. Ida and Hardy Zehmer, 
for example, both testified that the farm had no equipment or value 
except for the presence of a farmhouse and two head of cattle; they 
said nothing to suggest that the property contained valuable natural 
resources.222 
Viewing the conversation between Zehmer and Lucy through 
this lens, one can understand why Zehmer might have thought that 
$50,000 was an attractive price at first but changed his mind after 
realizing that it was so agreeable to Lucy. Zehmer likely became 
aware of his land’s potential value only after Lucy walked out of 
Zehmer’s restaurant excitedly waving the restaurant receipt-cum-
contract. Lucy’s zeal in enforcing the contract and Zehmer’s strong 
resistance to selling are in tension with Justice Buchanan’s 
proclamation that $50,000 was, if not a windfall for Zehmer, a fair 
price for the land. A careful examination of Dinwiddie property 
records provides reason to question the accuracy of Justice 
Buchanan’s valuation. 
Subsequent events reveal the true value of the Ferguson farm. 
On December 17, 1954, Hardy and Ida Zehmer finally conveyed the 
Ferguson farm to the Lucys for the bargained-for price of $50,000.223 
On January 5, 1955, less than a month after the final sale, the Lucy 
brothers executed a timber deed granting the right to all the 
merchantable timber on the property to the Lumber Distribution 
 
 222. A review of Ida Zehmer’s deposition testimony, for example, reveals a telling exchange 
in which Harrison pushed Ida to describe objects of value on the property: 
Q. What else did the word, “complete”, include other than the land and buildings 
thereon? 
A. I know of nothing else except the cows. 
Q. There was no farming equipment on the property at the time? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. The property consisted of farm and buildings thereon? And two heads of cattle? 
A. That is right. 
Record, supra note 20, at 24. Harrison proceeded to ask Hardy Zehmer similar questions, and 
he received similar answers. See id. at 41 (recording an exchange in which Harrison asked 
whether “there [was] anything else [on the property] except a couple cows” and Zehmer 
replied, “No, sir”). 
 223. Deed, supra note 25, at 365. 
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Company of Petersburg, Virginia.224 To execute this purchase, the 
Lumber Distribution Company borrowed $85,000, suggesting that at 
least that much—and perhaps more—was paid to the Lucy brothers.225 
By April 1956, the Lumber Distribution Company had removed 
all the merchantable timber from the formerly forested portions of 
the property and had filed a deed of release, freeing the Lucy 
brothers from their obligations under the contract and enabling them 
to otherwise dispose of the property.226 Immediately thereafter, 
Welford Lucy sold the formerly wooded portion of the property, 
which amounted to 367.7 of the original 471.6 acres, to the 
Continental Timber Lands Corporation,227 an affiliate of the 
Continental Can Company.228 Because the Continental Timber Lands 
Corporation evidently had no need to secure financing for the 
transaction, there is no public record of what Welford received in his 
truncated sale of the property.229 
Following this sale, Welford leased the remaining 103.9 acres of 
the Ferguson farm—the portion suitable for farming—to W. Franklin 
Townsend, enabling Townsend to reside on the property as a tenant 
farmer and granting him an option to buy the property for $12,000 as 
early as 1961.230 On May 14, 1962, after Townsend had informed Lucy 
 
 224. Timber Deed (1955), in 91 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 40, 40–42. Although this 
deed was officially notarized on January 5, 1955, it may have been first drawn up even earlier. 
For example, the agreement specifically grants the Lumber Distribution Company a period of 
three years from December 21, 1954, to cut and remove the timber on the property. Id. 
Presumably, this date was chosen for a reason. Id. at 41. Because the Lucy brothers only 
received a deed for the property from the Zehmers on December 17, 1954, Deed, supra note 25, 
at 365—a Friday—the brothers apparently had papers drafted to sell the property within two 
business days of having received the deed.  
 225. This figure is the amount recorded in the trust deed filed by the Lumber Distribution 
Company, which states the amount that the company had borrowed from the Petersburg 
Savings and American Trust Company to finance the sale. Deed of Trust (1955), in 91 
DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 44, 45. Ironically, one of Hardy Zehmer’s attorneys—
William Earle White—served as a trustee for the Petersburg bank in the transaction, id. at 46, 
and would accordingly have been able to see how much the timber on his client’s farm was 
worth shortly after his loss before the Virginia Supreme Court, see Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 
516, 516, 522–23 (Va. 1954) (deciding against Zehmer on November 22, 1952). 
 226. Deed of Release (1956), in 95 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 71, 71–72.  
 227. Deed & Plat (1956), in 95 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 72, 72–74.  
 228. Merger (1958), in 103 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 402, 402.  
 229. Had the Continental Timber Lands Corporation borrowed finances to purchase the 
tract, a bank would have filed a trust deed on the property, which would have provided a better 
estimate of what Lucy received from the transaction. Despite an exhaustive search of local 
records related to the parties and the property, no such deed has been found.  
 230. Complaint at 1–2, Townsend v. Lucy, No. 611A (Va. Cir. Ct. Dinwiddie County 1962).  
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that he intended to exercise this option and had arranged for the 
payment of the $12,000, Lucy—not one to shy away from a fight or an 
opportunity—refused to deliver title to the property.231 Townsend and 
his wife filed a complaint to compel performance, again in Judge 
Jefferson’s court, and later settled with Lucy for a revised price of 
$15,000.232 
Based on this evidence, we can begin to piece together the 
profits the Lucy brothers made from their purchase and truncated 
sale of the Ferguson farm. Assuming that the Lucy brothers sold the 
farm’s timber for $85,000—the price that the Lumber Distribution 
Company borrowed from the Petersburg Savings and American Trust 
Bank233—and that the 367.7 acres of land sold to Continental were 
sold at the same per-acre price as the price originally agreed to by 
Welford and Townsend—$12,000 for 103.9 acres234—we estimate that 
by 1962 the Lucy brothers had earned at least $142,000 from their 
$50,000 investment less than a decade earlier.235 
This is not a scientific calculation. It assumes for convenience 
that the previously wooded 367.7 acres were sold at the same price as 
the 103.9 acres that were used for farming and that contained the 
dwellings and farm equipment. Our calculation also does not include 
the income from leasing the farm to Townsend before the sale in 
1962. Nonetheless, it is our best approximation based on the available 
evidence. If anything, reports from the Lucy descendants suggest that 
our estimate might be too conservative. John C. Lucy III, for 
example, recalled being told that John and Welford had earned at 
least four times what they had paid for the farm in 1954.236 Taken 
 
 231. Id. at 3. 
 232. Deed of Trust (1962), 114 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 302, 302–04.  
 233. Because the timber was used as collateral for the loan, the loan likely would not have 
exceeded the value of the collateral. 
 234. At that agreed upon price—$12,000 for 103.9 acres—367.7 acres would be worth 
$42,468. 
 235. $85,000 (our estimated price for the timber) + $42,468 (our estimated price for the 
367.7 acres of timberland) + $15,000 (our estimated price paid by Townsend for the farmland) = 
$142,468. 
 236. Interview with John C. Lucy III and John C. Lucy IV, supra note 208. Neighbors and 
members of the Zehmer family also report that the Ferguson farm had a grand Southern estate 
house on it. The estate house was torn down sometime after the Lucys bought the property. 
One neighbor suggests that Lucy sold the house so that it could be taken apart piece by piece 
and then shipped to and rebuilt by a businessman up North. Interview with Floyd M. Harrison 
Jr., supra note 110. We have not been able to confirm this report, but if true, it also would 
increase the estimated profit that Lucy made from the Ferguson farm. The story is consistent 
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together, the evidence convincingly suggests that Lucy, and not 
Zehmer, reaped windfall profits from the sale enforced by the 
Virginia Supreme Court in Lucy v. Zehmer. 
CONCLUSION 
Prudent parents have reminded their children for generations 
that money does not grow on trees. Our investigation into Lucy v. 
Zehmer suggests that legal scholars should revisit that conclusion. 
Money can grow on trees, and it was doing just that in southern 
Virginia when Zehmer and Lucy met just before Christmas in 1952. 
The Lucy brothers, understanding that changing circumstances were 
making southern timberlands more valuable, were quick to capitalize 
on these developments. Most landowners like Zehmer, by contrast, 
were slower to understand these trends, even as middlemen like the 
Lucy brothers expressed considerable interest in what historically had 
been remote and commercially undesirable lands.237 A frequent 
consequence when a broker met a landowner was a speedy sale that 
the landowner promptly regretted. A long list of litigated cases, some 
now famous, memorializes the economic and social turbulence that 
this industrialization stirred. 
This was the context in which Lucy met Zehmer for a drink 
before Christmas in 1952, and understanding this context changes the 
interpretation of the case. Justice Buchanan, looking at the outward 
manifestations of Zehmer’s reported conduct and believing that 
$50,000 was more than a fair price, concluded that Lucy had been 
reasonable in thinking that Zehmer had intended to become 
contractually bound and thus enforced the written instrument. Our 
 
with Lucy’s liquidation of other assets on the property and may explain some of the extra profits 
described by John C. Lucy’s descendants. 
 237. In a sense, Lucy v. Zehmer was rooted in an asymmetry of information between the 
Lucy brothers—industry middlemen who regularly kept apprised of the industry’s growing 
capacity and demand—and Zehmer—a local landowner who lacked this critical knowledge. 
Lucy was not the only lumberman to take advantage of his superior knowledge about the value 
of timberlands. Indeed, a study commissioned by the Virginia legislature found that small 
sawmills had exploited their market knowledge and the “ignorance” of family landowners. See 
supra note 180 and accompanying text. Problems arising out of asymmetric information are 
nothing new to contract law, and courts have grappled with cases arising out of disparities in 
knowledge between buyers and sellers at least since the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in 
Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). In that case, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for 
the Court, ruled that a buyer is not obligated to share his superior knowledge with a prospective 
seller “where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties.” Id. at 195. 
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall warned, “[E]ach party must take care not to say or do any 
thing tending to impose upon the other.” Id. 
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research suggests that the value of the farm’s timber alone far 
exceeded $50,000. We also know that Dinwiddie County was 
swarming with aggressive timber brokers like the Lucy brothers, 
many of whom employed unseemly tactics, many of whom had their 
eyes on the Ferguson farm, and many of whom—the record indicates 
as many as twenty-five—had been previously rebuffed by Zehmer. In 
light of this context of rapidly rising land values and hastily created 
contracts, one can understand Judge Jefferson’s refusal to intervene 
and enforce the contract. 
We conclude that the outward manifestations observed by 
Justice Buchanan and the Virginia Supreme Court revealed only part 
of what was well known to the parties—and likely well known to the 
trial judge as well. Ironically, the historical analysis of the case that is 
most often used to teach the objective method of contracts in fact 
demonstrates the deep limitations of that method. Although 
“objective” connotes a scientific approach, relying on different 
outward manifestations can lead to different conclusions.  
Cicero demanded that historians, above all, must tell the truth.238 
The story of Lucy v. Zehmer reveals that the truth frequently offers 
sufficient material for talented historians and creative lawyers to 
construct alternative narratives. Although our reconstruction of Lucy 
v. Zehmer contrasts sharply with the traditional telling, the case 
remains a useful tool for studying the objective theory of contracts. 
Both Justice Buchanan’s account and our own are supported by facts. 
Therein lies the art of the objective method. 
POSTSCRIPT 
Five decades after Justice Buchanan issued his opinion in Lucy v. 
Zehmer, a law professor at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill prepared to discuss the case with his contracts class. 
Surveying the class to select a student to summarize the facts of the 
case, one name caught his eye. “Mr. Lucy, would you care to share 
what you know about this case?” That student was John C. Lucy IV, 
the great-grandson of the original coplaintiff, John C. Lucy.239 Once 
again, a Lucy was being asked to explain the curious events that 
 
 238. See 2 CICERO, DE ORATORE ¶ 62, at 245 (E.W. Sutton trans., 3d prtg. 1967) (“For who 
does not know history’s first law to be that an author must not dare to tell anything but the 
truth? And its second that he must make bold to tell the whole truth? That there must be no 
suggestion of partiality anywhere in his writings? Nor of malice?”). 
 239. Interview with John C. Lucy III and John C. Lucy IV, supra note 208. 
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transpired in a Dinwiddie restaurant just days before Christmas in 
1952. 
Much has changed in Dinwiddie County since that night in 1952. 
The development of Interstate Highways 85 and 95, for example, has 
had a devastating effect on local businesses along Highway 1. A drive 
through the area reveals a virtual rust belt of old hotels and 
restaurants like Zehmer’s place, Ye Olde Virginnie. Even Ye Olde 
Virginnie is no longer open to those passing through town; instead, in 
an ironic twist, Ye Olde Virginnie has been transformed into a 
retirement community. Many of these changes began with the 
transformation of Virginia’s economy in the 1950s and 1960s. And 
leading the way was Governor Harrison, who is fondly remembered 
as a driving force behind the modernization of industry across the 
state.240 
The Lucy brothers in particular capitalized on these changes. 
Even as he supplied timber to industry titans, John C. Lucy built his 
own small timber empire called the Brunswick Box Company.241 
Originally founded to produce tobacco boxes, the company soon 
transitioned to manufacturing wood pallets for transporting 
supplies.242 The company is still run by Emory Lucy, one of John C. 
Lucy’s sons.243 Another son—John C. Lucy Jr.—founded his own 
pallet business, the Abell Lumber Corporation, a decade later.244 By 
the mid-1990s, John C. Lucy Jr.’s company had merged with other 
entities to become Pallet Management Systems, Inc., a multimillion-
dollar publicly traded company led by John C. Lucy Jr.’s son, John C. 
Lucy III.245 Though briefly successful, Pallet Management Systems 
experienced financial troubles during a market downturn several 
years after its incorporation and filed for bankruptcy protection in 
2003.246 Despite this loss, John C. Lucy III continues to work as 
president of Clary Lumber, a hardwood-lumber sawmill located in 
Gaston, North Carolina, that his father first bought to supply lumber 
 
 240. See Saxon, supra note 38 (“Mr. Harrison’s time in office came as the state turned from 
a rural to an industrialized society, and he contributed significantly to that development with 
road construction and other economic programs.”). 
 241. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. 
 245. Marguerite M. Plunkett, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at 1E. 
 246. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. 
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to the Abell Lumber Corporation.247 More than fifty years later, the 
Lucy family is still picking money off of trees.248 
Welford Lucy took a slightly different path after Lucy v. Zehmer. 
In 1954, Welford left Dinwiddie for Warrenton, Virginia, where he 
purchased a farm to raise cattle and opened a Stuckies store along 
Highway 17.249 Just over a decade later, after making a significant 
profit selling his Warrenton farm, Welford moved to Richmond to 
apply his talents to investing in real estate.250 Though Welford was 
initially successful at flipping other properties, his new business 
slowed down after a bad investment in an office building.251 The 
investment loss was not enough to ruin Welford financially, but it was 
a painful shock to the ego of a man remembered for his intense pride 
in his business talents.252 He later was sued by the buyer of another 
property for failing to disclose the existence of contaminated storage 
tanks that required an expensive cleanup.253 Welford lost that dispute, 
but when all was said and done, he still died a wealthy man.254 Family 
members report that John’s and Welford’s siblings all exhibited a 
canny business sense and enjoyed similar financial success, and that 
each of the five children who grew up on a struggling farm left 
lucrative estates for their descendants.255 
The timber industry has changed as well. Regional prices for 
timber eventually stabilized, and large entities emerged to manage 
 
 247. Id.; Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119. Welford reportedly had observed how 
profitable a Stuckey’s franchise had been for his daughter and son-in-law and had concluded 
that he too should pursue the opportunity. Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119. 
 248. Perhaps because of this continued success, members of the Lucy family speak with 
pride about the business activities of John and Welford—even when discussing the specific case 
of Lucy v. Zehmer. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra 
note 113. They realize, for example, how difficult the task of cruising timberlands and predicting 
timber prices could be, and they are proud that John and Welford were able, despite their 
limited educations, to build a burgeoning business from their natural talent and skills. Id. The 
Zehmers, by contrast, are much more reticent to discuss the case on the record, with one family 
member acknowledging that the case continues to carry a stigma for the family. Telephone 
Interview with a Zehmer Family Member, supra note 109. 
 249. Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119. 
 250. See id. Descendants recall that the development of Interstate 66 near Welford’s farm 
had dramatically raised the value of the property. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy 
III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Emergency Special Servs., Inc. v. Matrix Constr. Corp., 13 Va. Cir. 287, 287 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. 1988).  
 254. Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119. 
 255. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. 
RICHMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  12:32 AM 
1562 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1511 
and harvest timberlands more efficiently than their family-owned 
predecessors. A majority of the Ferguson farm remains controlled by 
these interests to this day, with neat rows of pine trees packed 
together across the expansive property and signs of a small harvest 
apparent on its periphery. 
Perhaps one other thing that will change will be the way law 
students understand Lucy v. Zehmer. Unlike the caricature portrayed 
in the contracts classroom, the case involved sophisticated 
businessmen, a tumultuous economic climate, and the persistent 
lesson that appellate courts—and generations of contracts scholars—
should be hesitant before confidently claiming to understand the facts 
of the case before them. 
